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Sustainable Development Goals and forests

Prospects, integration, priorities and experience of Africa

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African Model Forests Network

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RESEAU AFRICAIN DE FORETS MODELES

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Executive summary

At Rio+20, in June 2012, the governments and civil societies of the world met in the framework of the United Nations to renew global commitments and lay out a Common Vision for Sustainable Development beyond 2015. In item 248, the Outcome Document of the Conference mandated an Open Working Group (OWG) of 30 representatives from the five UN regional groups to develop, through fully inclusive and transparent methods, a global framework of Sustainable Development Goals. With other post-2015 work streams brought together by the UN Secretary General, this Goal Framework is to be the basis for negotiating a replacement to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set to expire in September 2015.

Established in January 2013, the Intergovernmental Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) worked actively through September 2014 to submit a final report including 17 goals and 169 targets covering a broad range of sustainable development issues. On 10 September 2014, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution making the OWG's proposal "the main basis for integrating SDGs into the post-2015 development agenda". This effectively marked the beginning of intergovernmental negotiations for a global sustainable development agenda that will replace the MDGs.

This discussion paper is part of a series of regional papers supported by IIED to gather evidence and enable dialogue with key constituencies in Africa, Asia and Latin America on how best to frame the inclusion of forests in the post-2015 development framework. As background to this study, IIED identified the potential for a 'modular' or 'integrated' approach that highlights the relevance of multiple goal areas to forests, as well as missing issues, synergies and trade-offs. While the focus is on forests, Sustainable Development through multi-sector integration remains the overarching goal.

This paper focuses on Africa. It reviews key lessons from the MDGs from the joint perspective of African and Least Developed countries (LDCs), in order to highlight the challenging nature of the SDGs for African countries and to better discuss the outcome of the OWG process. In that light, the paper acknowledges the universally acclaimed results of the MDGs, from half a billion fewer people in extreme poverty to the successes over deadly diseases such as malaria and HIV, the millions of lives saved each year from infant and maternal mortality or the two billion people and more who have gained access to improved drinking water.

But the paper also recognises the 'frontier' nature of the MDGs shortcomings regarding the continuous deterioration of natural resources, including forests, and still rising greenhouse gas emissions, on one hand, and the 1.2 billion people still in extreme poverty, on the other. Overall, the world consumes more of its natural resources than it can replace. In addition, most of the increase in global CO_2 emissions of the last two decades came, by far, from the developing world but per capita emissions remain almost four times higher in the developed world. This means that, under current growth patterns, development and the environment are set on a definite collision course. This will happen unless the SDGs truly translate into a new innovation-driven, eco-friendly industrial model that can overcome the carbon lock-in of the current economy to scale up and spread prosperity without destroying the earth's natural capital. On the other hand, analyses of poverty that have come out over the last six years warn us of the structural conditions that may constitute a trap for the billion or so people still at the bottom of world's development. This is particularly significant for Africa, which diverged from most of the developing world in the 1960s and which is the only region where extreme poverty has kept growing, from 290 million people in 1990 to 414 million in 2010.

Looking closer at the African economy of the last twenty years and relying on a mass of evidence collected and analysed by a wide and highly credible diversity of sources, the paper found, however, an extremely nuanced and also challenging picture. Despite the negative poverty figures and contrary to the situation that generated widespread afro-pessimism in the 1990s, Africa has become, almost unnoticed at first, the second fastest growing region since the late 1990s. By 2008, Africa's collective GDP (US$1.6 trillion) was roughly equal to those of Brazil or Russia and its combined consumer spending was higher than those of India or Russia. Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, has become and remains a prime destination for Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), and its growth is broad-based geographically, widespread across sectors (not just commodity-based), includes low- and middle-income countries, is accompanied by productivity improvements and has real staying power.

At the same time, Africa's structural transformation is yet to be achieved and increased competitiveness disparities are appearing between countries and clusters of countries, fostering "tales of two [or several] Africas". Sub-Saharan Africa's ability to capture productivity spill-overs from FDIs has been disappointing and the region's economic foundations remain consistently weaker than other developing regions such as Southeast Asia, for instance. The most pronounced deficits include key structural conditions, such as higher education and training, technological readiness, innovation, market size and infrastructure. For example, the opportunity cost of bad roads, bad logistics and power outages is prohibitively high for businesses - indigenous and foreign - operating in Africa. In return, these costs impact negatively on the regional integration and market size of African economies, taking away the advantage and economies of scale they should have had from rising demographics and increased consumer spending. The paper's analysis of forests and SDGs in Africa is based on an evaluation of the ways in which this inclusive growth gap – that is, the gap between growth and structural transformation combined with a remaining inability to create productivity-enhancing jobs at a scale sufficient to generate wealth and prosperity across all segments of society – is reflected in the structure of the forest economy.

The paper's key finding is the *'inverted'* nature of the African forest economy. While other world regions make between 68 per cent and 76 per cent of their forest value added from high-value processed goods, Africa does the reverse. It makes 65 per cent of its forest value from primary forestry activities, such as logging and fuel wood collection. And even this low value utilisation of its forests is sluggish, representing a tiny 6.5 per cent of what the world makes from the primary forest subsector. Worse, the forest economy did not contribute in any significant way to the African growth story of the last 15-20 years, compounding the underdevelopment trap that such structural configuration represents.

The forest challenge is the same as the broader African economic challenge, except that it is more acute. The paper argues that part of the problem lies with a narrative on forests that remains cast around an old colonial paradigm that opposes logging and biodiversity conservation, effectively turning them into unique strategic poles for the forest sector. Both have value but they cannot be the strategic underpinning of decisive post-2015 contribution of forests to the economic convergence of Africa with the rest of the world.

Because of these unique features, the post-2015 priority goals and targets for African forests cannot be the same as those of other regions. They must first meet key African priorities in structural transformation, productivity and diversification and be driven by focused investments in green innovations and productive systems. The 'sustainable use' paradigm that has kept most of non-timber uses of forests at the margins of poverty must be replaced by a radically different social economy powered by innovative R&D in support of local people and local forest value chains. The paper applies a magnifying class to a sample of African innovations to show the bubbling number of such projects and their considerable potential. Novel ways of financing and managing those investments, including through better targeting of green climate funds and better use of human capabilities and strategic information need to be found. For this to happen, the traditional conservative outlook on African forests must change.

The goal framework, as it was cast and submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 2014 does not properly reflect African priorities in the forest and terrestrial ecosystem Goal 15. It does not also pay sufficient attention to the critical interconnectivity of the forest sector with agriculture and food security as well as with health and nutrition (goal 3 as well goal 2). The Africa forest module that the papers presents (figure 12) is a tool that can help align the sector with Africa's transformational priorities. This does not require redrawing or renegotiating Goal 15 or any part of the framework; rather, it provides a fresh angle for policy makers to look at, in ways that would be more integrative and attentive to the novel and transformational connections needed to achieve the SDGs in African forested landscapes.

The position of African and LDCs in this new century is an historic novelty. The world is at the door of a Third Industrial Revolution and never, since the beginning of the First, has it witnessed the scale of ground-breaking growth and transformation that has been happening in developing nations over the last 40 years. Never has any group of countries had as much material and strategic information at its disposal for doing it 'right' as do African and Least Developed Countries today. Because these countries will need to 'leapfrog' and do it 'differently', important risks are involved in this process. Untested

methods and manufacturing processes will need to be developed, as well as new, more productive and at the same time more sustainable, green-blue enterprises. A hybrid network of traditional businesses and social enterprises will need to be fostered along with better use of local indigenous knowledge and systems of intellectual property rights that will strengthen African capabilities and innovation strategies. Risk, uncertainty, and surprise are inherent to real system shifts, and that is exactly what the UN system is setting itself to take on in a shared post-2015 agenda. African forests need to be a full part of this unfolding story, not just as a natural reserve of old, but as fertile ground for inventing new ways of working with nature to create lasting social wealth and prosperity.

Introduction

On 23 September 2014, at the United Nations Climate Summit, a few dozen governments, businesses and campaigners pledged to end global loss of natural forests by 2030. Signatories to the New York Declaration on Forests claim that their actions would avoid between 4.5 billion and 8.8 billion tons of carbon dioxide emissions each year by 2030 – the equivalent of taking all the world's cars off the road. This includes pledges from global food corporations to halt palm oil, soy, paper and beef-related deforestation by 2020. Governments, including Germany, Norway and the UK, also promised payments to countries that reduce forest emissions and to support alternatives to smallholder farmers' clearing of forests. Thus, on the eve of the UN negotiation of a post-2015 sustainable development future, once again a pledge was made to halt deforestation to help save the earth's climate.

The role of forests in shaping a sustainable future for the planet is widely recognised, even though it did not seem to be sufficiently addressed in the first framework documents for post-2015 sustainable development goals published in May 2014. The Climate Summit expressed that broad consensus by highlighting the multidimensional contribution of forests:

"Action to conserve, sustainably manage and restore forests can contribute to economic growth, poverty alleviation, rule of law, food security, climate resilience and biodiversity conservation."[1]

This calls for an intelligent response – so far saving forests and saving the climate have generated lots of hypothetical solutions rather than practical on the ground measures. Goal 7 of the *Millennium Development Goals Report 2013* notes that, despite the sustainable forest policies of most countries, natural forests are still disappearing at a high rate, with South America and Africa losing some 3.4 – 3.6 million ha of forest per year between 2005 and 2010. At the same time, there has been accelerated growth of global carbon dioxide emissions over the past two decades, from 10 per cent during 1990-2000 to 33 per cent during 2000-2010. More significantly for any post-2015 discussion, most of this increase, by far, came from the developing world, where emissions increased by 48 per cent during 1990-2000 and by 81 per cent in the following decade. At the same time, per capita emissions remain almost four times higher in the developed world (11 metric tons per year as compared with three metric tons per year in the developing world). Together, these facts highlight the fundamental paradox and challenge of the development agenda of our time. If poverty is eliminated and development follows a similar pattern to that of Western economies over the past 70 years, it will be impossible to realise sustainability and there will be few natural resources, including land, left to sustain such continuous growth patterns.

What should be done about it, and how it is likely to affect the development prospects of the so-called 'Africa+' or the world's 'bottom billion' (Collier, 2008)? This question is at the heart of the discussion on forests and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). For example, will carbon offsets and related incentives be enough to change the likely outcome? We are heading for a crash unless there is a fundamental rethink about very different and practical ways of producing wealth for all in the coming decades of the 21st century.

This discussion paper is part of a series of regional papers supported by an IIED project[2] to gather evidence and enable dialogue with key constituencies in Africa, Asia and Latin America on how best to include forests in the post-2015 development framework. IIED is looking for ways to include forest-related targets and indicators and has identified the potential for a 'modular' or integrated approach that highlights the relevance of multiple goal areas to forests, as well as missing issues, synergies and trade-offs. While the focus of this project may be on forests, sustainable development is the overarching area of interest – forests provide an excellent opportunity to bring together different perspectives from wide-ranging sectors and stakeholders to work towards the common goal of sustainable development.

[1] http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48801, Consulted September 24, 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/sep/23/un-climate-summit-pledge-forests-new-york-declaration

[2] IIED has been contracted by the Climate and Land Use Alliance (CLUA) to implement a project entitled 'Trees can score goals: Evidence synthesis, dialogue and advocacy to help integrate forests in the post-2015 development framework.'

This paper discusses the issue in three major sections. The first focuses on the UN process and the strategic lessons learned from the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) regarding poverty and development. The second section looks at forests in the context of the Open Working Group preparatory work for a SDG framework. And the last section revisits those questions from an African standpoint, by considering Africa-wide development convergences and priorities in light of current challenges and paradoxes as well as future transformational prospects. In the two last sections, a wider perspective is used to consider broader patterns and practices concerning forests that can inform on core gaps and enabling conditions for truly inclusive and sustainable transformation in Africa and elsewhere by 2030.

The Millennium challenge: from MDGs to SDGs

At the Millennium Summit in 2000, world leaders met at the United Nations in New York, where they adopted the Millennium Declaration. This marked the world's desire to deliver a better future for all. In April 2001, the UN Secretary General proposed a framework – the MDGs – to help achieve that aspiration. The key objective of the MDGs was to combat poverty by ensuring healthcare for all, especially women and children, educating more girls, fighting killer diseases such as AIDS and promoting sustainable management of the environment by 2015. The international community is now drafting a replacement of the MDGs, while also considering wider sustainable development issues. Why? Clearly, the MDGs did not deliver as expected, yet they are near-universally praised today for their positive results.

The UN's High Level Panel of Eminent Persons, which carried out nine months of intense work with civil society, governments, syndicates, experts from multilateral organisations and local authorities, published a report hailing the 'remarkable success'[3] of the MDGs. These achievements since 2000 include half a billion fewer people in extreme poverty; about three million children's lives saved each year; maternal mortality on the wane; deaths from malaria down by one-quarter, and HIV no longer an automatic death sentence. Also, over the past 21 years, more than two billion people gained access to improved drinking water.[4] A number of countries benefited from these changes but many – mostly Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the majority in Africa – did not. The *Millennium Development Goal Report 2013* clearly points out this disparity: 1.2 billion people still in extreme poverty, most of them in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. Sub-Saharan Africa, where half the population lives below the extreme poverty line of US$1.25 a day, is the only region where extreme poverty has kept growing, from 290 million people in 1990 to 414 million in 2010.

These shortcomings and a few others mitigate the outcomes from the MDGs. Yes, there has been success, but there is a divergence, particularly in Africa, which needs to be recognised. This should not be taken lightly: by 2045, one in five persons will be African; there will be nearly twice as many Africans than there are Chinese. If Africa, or some parts of Africa plus a few other nations in Central Asia and the Pacific fail, the repercussions will be felt across the planet and for a long time to come. It is therefore important to take a closer look and to understand the true nature and root causes of this divergence, as well as its import on the UN post-2015 process, targets and methodological assumptions.

The 'bottom' and 'new bottom' billion: poverty and the power of narratives

A few years ago, Collier (2008)[5] coined the term 'bottom billion' to describe a category of countries that are diverging from the rest of the world, including other developing nations. Collier claims that these countries are stuck at the bottom; not just *falling behind* but also *falling apart* as a consequence of being caught in one (or several) of four deadly traps: being small with bad governance, being locked into conflicts, or landlocked and surrounded with bad neighbours, and/or poor with lots of natural resources. In addition, these countries may have missed the boat of global markets, because the very reasons that

[3] *A New Global Partnership: eradicate poverty and transform economies through sustainable development*. The Report of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the post-2015 Development Agenda. United Nations Publications, New York. p. 1
[4] *The Millennium Development Goal Report 2013*, Overview, p. 4.
[5] Collier, Paul. 2008. *The Bottom Billion: Why the poorest countries are failing and what can be done about it.* Oxford University Press, New York.

had helped Asia to 'converge' – that is to catch up – are the ones that make it difficult for this group of countries to make the break at this time in history.

Collier's analysis, though based on the premise of an utterly benevolent West, contains factual truths that forbid us to think of poverty eradication as simply adding and subtracting selected goals, targets, and achievements, quantified and averaged against such goals. It should be obvious that poverty is systemic. Whatever the factors, or traps, internal to each country, the main thrust of a global eradication framework must be to create enabling conditions that shift the parameters of the global poverty ecosystem. Though goals and targets are important, they can only be signposts that reinforce and supplement those processes, and it must be highlighted that the MDGs achievements relied on trends, which had been building up in the developing world for about 20 years prior to the Millennium Declaration.

In a 2011 article[6], Andy Sumner boldly countered Collier's view with a new story. By pointing out the fact that a 'new bottom billion' of about 960 million poor people now live in middle income countries (MICs) such as China, India, Indonesia, Nigeria and Pakistan, Sumner challenged the notion that poor people all live in poor countries as a false premise. This is so because, 'since 2000, over 700 million poor people have "moved" into MICs by way of their countries' graduating from low-income status'[7] (see Figure 1). As a result, according to Sumner: 'Only about a quarter of the world's poor – about 370 million people or so – live in the remaining 39 low-income countries, which are largely in sub-Saharan Africa.'

Fig. 1. The move of the world's poor from Low to Middle Income Countries (Sumner, 2011)

At the core of these differing views is the question of whether to target poor people or poor countries in international efforts to overcome poverty. The question is highly strategic and sensitive. There is also an issue of terminology, language and discourse.

Let's start first with some issues related to meanings. There is, indeed, another potential trap laid by discourse, notably the language of statistics and the politics of categorisation. Neither Collier nor Sumner uses LDCs as a category directly relevant to their analyses. The UN General Assembly established the LDCs as an official group of poorer countries in 1971 in order to focus support and attention on their special needs and structural vulnerabilities. From 24 members at the beginning, its membership more than doubled before coming back down to 48 in 2014. In some 43 years, only four countries, Botswana in 1994, Cape Verde in 2007, Maldives in 2011, and Samoa in January 2014, have managed to 'graduate' from this category.

This is evocative of Collier's bottom billion. To avoid stigmatising the 58 countries he identified, Collier

Fig. 2



[6] Sumner, A. 2010. *Global Poverty and the New Bottom Billion: What if three-quarters of the world's poor live in Middle-Income Countries.* IDS Working Paper 349, IDS, Sussex.
[7] Sumner, A. 2011 (March). *The New Bottom Billion: What if most of the world's poor live in Middle-Income Countries?* CGD Brief, Center for Global Development, Institute of Development Studies, Sussex.

does not name them, but we know that his list must more or less include the LDCs plus about a dozen additional countries. To make it more complicated, Sumner's classification of Low Income Countries (LICs) and Middle Income Countries (MICs) is different. He identifies only 40 LICs, and the MICs include LDCs such as Senegal and Lesotho. It is legitimate for scientists to use methodologies appropriate to their research, but the lack of direct comparability of data considerably blurs the statistical picture. This makes it easier to fall into the kind of fallacy spurred by the new bottom billion narrative. Some assert that 'the percentage of global poverty accounted for by MICs […] has still *risen* considerably […] since 1990'[8], but this is mainly an optical illusion. The number of poor people in countries such as China, India, Indonesia and Nigeria did not rise after 1990; it actually *fell*. The bigger numbers are just a statistical effect of those big countries 'taking all their poor with them' into the new class of MICs. For example, China had the largest number of poor people anywhere on Earth in 1980, but by 2010, although the gap between rich and poor had grown hugely, it had lifted 680 million people out of poverty – more than the entire current population of Latin America. Outside China, it is estimated that the acceleration in growth since 2000 has cut the number of people in extreme poverty by 280m[9].

What shall we do? Poverty and the LDCs+

Obviously, the controversy about the bottom billion has practical and strategic implications. A flurry of interventions provoked by Sumner's article resuscitated a form of moral crusade against poverty: 'the moral necessity to aid the poor no matter where they are'[10]. This is somewhat legitimate. Analytically, it is improper and even dangerous to equate poverty with the global state of a country, as has become the norm in international development discourse. Sumner is right about that. But there is a risk of getting lost in the process, while stigmatising the emerging nations that have not yet levelled out the playing field at home. Poverty, whether personal or group, is subnational. Poor people exist virtually everywhere. There are plenty of rich people in 'poor countries' and lots of poor in richer countries. Whether this should modify development aid flows is a totally separate question that addresses another level of the equation, which is geopolitical.

The fact that a country is poor is an average. It is also a performance (or underperformance) and a relationship – with other countries, markets, donors and corporations. The poverty of a country is inherited, has certain levels of path dependency, and certainly happens at political and time scales that have nothing to do with personal poverty. Finally, global poverty cannot be addressed at purely personal or national scales. Addressing it requires strategies. To be realistic and efficient, these strategies must be integrated and shaped at localised levels to take into account the inequalities in means, power, and influence between different world regions, and the role of those inequalities in producing or reinforcing the relative poverty of nations.

Issues of inequality are markedly different from conditions for growth and development. The world system as we know it was built with inherent inequality. Our known development paths actually *create* inequality and vulnerability. The new emerging countries did not invent this and the good statistics on extreme poverty do not nullify it; the extreme poverty line of US$1.25 a day is about the price of a cup of coffee in Europe. The clear agenda for this century is the need to do things differently, in ways that are greener and definitely more inclusive. But the key question is about the countries – and regions that risk being left behind for a long time. This is mainly the LDCs plus a few structurally similar countries in the MICs category. Sumner recognises that 'not all MICs are to be treated the same'[11]. Africa, particularly, is a matter of prime interest. In a June 2013 paper on the future of poverty, the Economist made the point that even 20 more years of the strides made over the past decade will not move the remaining

[8] See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_New_Bottom_Billion Consulted 20 October 2014
[9] See http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21578643-world-has-astonishing-chance-take-billion-people-out-extreme-poverty-2030-not Consulted 20 October 2014
[10] See https://futurechallenges.org/local/gesperspectives/the-new-bottom-billion-the-ethics-of-international-aid-cuts-to-the-poor-in-middle-income-countries/ Consulted 20 October 2014.
[11] This is a good point. Obviously, nobody is going to try 'to save China' from its current inequalities. It is too big, doesn't need it, and will probably not accept the interference. At the same time, it is good to underline the vulnerability of countries such as Cameroon and Sudan, as their reality is fundamentally the same as that of Senegal and Ethiopia, for instance.

millions of Africans out of poverty[12]. At current growth rates, a quarter of Africans will still be living on less than US$1.25 a day in 2030. There is a need to break the stranglehold on accelerated development in this group of countries, while inventing new ways of growing greener and more inclusive economies in the process.

This leads to one of the most interesting points made by Collier. He says the MDGs were 'a big advance' that encouraged people to shift their agenda from inputs to outcomes, but they had two weaknesses, both involving a lack of focus. There was lack of focus in tracking the problems of the whole five billion people at the top instead of just the last bottom billion; there was another critical lack of focus on the strategies to achieve the goals. 'Growth is not a cure-all but lack of growth is a kill-all' (Collier, p190).

This lack of focus concerned a few critical observers of the High Level Panel report. LDC Watch published a statement[13] criticising the report for 'being deeply disappointing for LDCs civil society', for giving 'no special attention to the LDCs as called for in previously agreed development efforts', and for being 'regressive' in not including specific MDG targets on trade justice, aid and debt cancellation in relation to LDCs.

> "*The LDCs – 34 being in Sub-Saharan Africa – have been identified as such because they face acute development challenges resulting from persistent poverty and vulnerability and hence, marginalising the LDCs is a grave oversight in terms of the so-called bold yet practical post-2015 development agenda. More than 75 per cent of the nearly 900 million LDC populations live in poverty and the LDCs are the most off track in achieving the Internationally Agreed Development Goals (IADGs), including the MDGs. They consistently occupy the bottom rung of the Human Development Index… The UN post-2015 development agenda must therefore not only recognise the need for special development attention of LDCs, but also ensure that these are at the centre of any strategy for implementing the agenda."*

In an issue paper devoted to the place and role of LDCs in post-2015 debates, Tighe Geoghegan (2014)[14] also notes the relative neglect of LDCs in the official high level post-2015 agenda, particularly in the High Level Panel and Sustainable Development Solutions Network reports where they are mentioned only three times in all. She notes some disagreements among LDC development experts on strategies and approaches, but also wide agreement on four key agenda items: (i) the need for poverty-eradicating economic transformation; (ii) the need for fair deals for LDCs on climate change, trade and debt reduction; (iii) the opportunity for leap-frogging into low-carbon green economy development models with the right strategies, incentives and investment; (iv) supportive post-2015 framework for equitable governance, integration of the different dimensions of development and diversification of development finance. Most importantly:

> *"LDCs can offer important lessons on past development failures and successes, and testing grounds for new approaches… The international community […] would do well to listen to what LDC development experts and observers are saying. In many ways, the success of this new post-2015 agenda may be judged by how effectively it contributes to development progress in this group of countries (ibid)."*

This can be said also, and in particular, of African voices that make up the bulk of the LDCs and share some structural conditions with them when not officially considered as such.

[12] Poverty, not always with us. See http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21578643-world-has-astonishing-chance-take-billion-people-out-extreme-poverty-2030-not

[13] *Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda: Keeping LDCs at center stage.* LDC Watch International Secretariat, Kathmandu, Nepal.

[14] Geoghegan, Tighe. 2014. *Convergence and Contention. The Least Developed Countries in post-2015 debates*. IIED Issue Paper, IIED, London.

SDGs and forests: from MDG 7 to SDG 15, what has changed?

Target 7.A – reversing the loss of environmental resources – is one of the worst performing areas in the MDGs. Despite progress on tree planting by a handful of countries, 13 million ha of natural forests were lost each year between 2000 and 2010. Fish stocks also continued to be depleted, while carbon emissions kept rising and water resources became more and more scarce. This contradiction between the considerable strides made against poverty in many regions and the continuous decline of the natural ecosystem on which our lives are based is extremely alarming. At least a hundred million of the world's poorest households depend on forests and other natural resources for food, medicine and other essentials. The question, therefore, is to understand what has been missing in the attempt to reverse those negative trends, and to assess the extent to which the SDG process, particularly the OWG proposed SDGs, is responding to the challenge posed to the MDGs by the continuous depletion of natural resources. The aim of this section is to shed light on the relationship between the goals and the actual process of bringing about sustainable development through integration. The critical case of forests will illustrate our point.

The Open Working Group (OWG) on SDGs

At Rio+20, in June 2012, the governments and civil societies of the world met under the auspices of the United Nations to renew global commitments and lay out a Common Vision for Sustainable Development. The outcome document of the conference – *The Future We Want*[15] – gave ample room to virtually all significant environment and development issues, including forests, poverty in all its forms, Africa and the LDCs. In item 248, the document resolved to establish an inclusive and transparent intergovernmental process on SDGs, open to all stakeholders, with a view to developing a global framework to be submitted to the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). It also mandated an Open Working Group (OWG) – of 30 representatives from the five UN regional groups – to develop a goal framework using fully inclusive and transparent methods.

The intergovernmental OWG on SDGs was established in January 2013. It was charged with proposing a set of SDGs to the UNGA by September 2014 that should be 'limited in number, inspirational and easy to communicate, addressing all three dimensions of sustainable development (social, economic and environmental)' calling on inputs from 'relevant stakeholders and expertise from civil society, the scientific community and the United Nations system in its work'.

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See http://www.uncsd2012.org/content/documents/727The%20Future%20We%20Want%2019%20June%201230pm.pdf Consulted 16 October 2014.

The OWG's final report included a chapeau, 17 goals and 169 targets covering a broad range of sustainable development issues (Box 1). On 10 September 2014, the UNGA adopted a resolution making the OWG's proposal the 'the main basis for integrating SDGs into the post-2015 development agenda', while recognising that 'other inputs will also be considered in this process'. This effectively marks the beginning of intergovernmental negotiation of a sustainable development agenda post-2015[16]. By the end of 2014, the Secretary-General will produce a synthesis report bringing together the results of all the different post-2015 work streams to facilitate the adoption of goals at the General Assembly in September 2015. The report of the OWG on SDGs will be among the inputs to this synthesis report.

Box 1. Proposed sustainable development goals

Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere
Goal 2: End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture
Goal 3: Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages
Goal 4: Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all
Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls
Goal 6: Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all
Goal 7: Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all
Goal 8: Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all
Goal 9: Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
Goal 10: Reduce inequality within and among countries
Goal 11: Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable
Goal 12: Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns
Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
Goal 14: Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development
Goal 15: Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development

The goal framework and forests

The OWG worked through 13 sessions from March 2013 to July 2014 to develop the framework of goals. The process was serious, strong and inclusive but leaves space to aim higher in a number of areas. This includes recognising the special and strategic importance for SDGs of LDCs and Africa, as well as critical issues of environment and development, including the role of forests in achieving a global sustainability agenda.

We will first look at the OWG work on forests – particularly the way in which forests have been reflected upon in successive goal documents and the mechanism that led to forests being part of the discussion. We will then give special attention to IIED's assessment of OWG zero draft and its ‗modular approach' to addressing the shortcomings of the global process regarding forests. Later, in the Africa section of this paper, we will consider some of the LDC/Africa issues that were highlighted to the OWG. Both will help shed light on African perspectives on SDGs and forests. It is worth noting that effective work took pace from the 9th session where the OWG Co-Chairs released a ‗stocktaking' document and a ‗focus area' document. The placement of forests in those documents alarmed forestry experts. At that time, forests were included in Focus Area 17 (biodiversity and ecosystems), while oceans had their own Focus (Area 16) and conservation and sustainable use of marine resources, oceans and seas, and agriculture were included in Focus Area 2 (sustainable agriculture, food security and nutrition). As Eduardo Rojas pointed out[17]:

"Currently we have neither a broad natural resources focus area, nor a forest-specific one. This division of natural resources across focus areas bears a huge risk that the perspective applied to Focus area 17 remains very narrow and restricted to a biodiversity perspective of forests.

[16] Negotiations began in September 2014. A new framework will be adopted at a high level summit in September 2015.
[17] Assistant Director-General Forestry Department at FAO in a mail sent to Godwin Kowero, Executive Secretary African Forest Forum (AFF), Wednesday, 26 March 2014 11:05 PM.

Forests and ecosystems/biodiversity are not interchangeable terms. Biodiversity and ecosystems should include much more than forests (and without marine ecosystems/oceans and agriculture they are a questionable concept), while a considerable part of forests and forestry cannot be limited to the biodiversity area, otherwise the active management or restoration of forests as well as their social and economic benefits will be simply invisible.

The current situation looks very similar to what was experienced during the MDG process leading to a narrow interpretation of forests with most of their contributions and functions disregarded or unrecognised. As it was emphasised by all our member countries, the SDG process should not replicate this and should apply an integrated approach to forests duly recognising the environmental, social and economic dimensions. The above structure does not seem to support this, with a high chance of Focus area 17 becoming mainly conservation-oriented."

As it turned out, the 10th session of OWG became a major decision point. There was some give and take, but the session helped identify possible targets to accompany each focus area, with more than 300 targets presented. This work lead to the establishment of a working document that delegates used in preparation for the 11th session. This session ended with some participants still hoping to influence the work before it is finally submitted for the long-awaited direct negotiating format.[18].

The goal framework was subsequently amended and reduced from 19 to 17 goals. Forests, as well as terrestrial ecosystems, were included as key components of Goal 15, but also featured in Goal 2 (Box 2). In that sense the OWG, though not perfect, was a good platform for a selective set of professionals to meet, discuss and modify the layout and action points of the outcome document.

IIED's modular approach for a transformative agenda

The International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), in its research, advisory and advocacy roles, undertook an assessment of the OWG's zero draft[19]. The Climate and Land Use Alliance (CLUA) supported the study. The IIED researchers found 'a strong set of goals and targets, yet with several potentially serious trade-offs and missing issues'.

Based on the experience of the MDGs, the researchers argued that the limited outlook provided by these goals and targets was insufficient. 'Critically, they did not sufficiently address the right enabling environment — through rights, systems, capabilities and metrics — for forests to deliver sustainable development.' IIED proposed a 'modular approach' that aims to help negotiators seek coherent outcomes across the goal framework and enable integrated implementation at the national level. Its focus is on negotiation, implementation and integration.

Box 2. Explicit Forest-related targets proposed

6.6 By 2020, protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes

15.1 By 2020, ensure the conservation, restoration and sustainable use of terrestrial and inland freshwater ecosystems and their services, in particular forests, wetlands, mountains and drylands, in line with obligations under international agreements

15.2 By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests and increase afforestation and reforestation by [x] percent globally

15.b Mobilize significant resources from all sources and at all levels to finance sustainable forest management and provide adequate incentives to developing countries to advance such management, including for conservation and reforestation

[18] *Earth Negotiation Bulletin: A reporting service for environment and development negotiations*. Vol. 32 No 11.
See http://www.iisd.ca/sdgs/owg11.

[19] See (a) Milledge, S, Macqueen, D, Reeves, J and Mayers, J. 2014. *Sustainable Development Goals: a forest module for a transformative agenda*. IIED Briefing Paper: Issue July 2014, International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK, and (b) Macqueen, D., Milledge, S. and Reeves, J. 2014. *SD goals from a forest perspective: Transformative, universal and integrated?* IIED Discussion Paper, International Institute for Environment and Development, London, UK.

This approach identified[20] about 10 goals where forests have a direct contribution to sustainable development outcomes. To guarantee these contributions, four categories of enablers were proposed to help forests deliver sustainable development. These were:

(i) Social justice within secure forest stewardship arrangements;
(ii) Fair, accessible and responsible market systems;
(iii) Organisational capabilities to manage multi-functional landscapes; and
(iv) Incentives and practical metrics.

The result is a matrix combining these four categories of enablers with the goals and targets identified through the OWG process (Figure 3).



From Macqueen, Milledge and Reeves, 2014

Forests are both a case and an illustration of SDGs integration and transformation issues. These are at the heart of any agenda that seeks to go beyond business as usual to address the shifts in strategies and practices that can allow real sustainability to occur. The modular approach offers an effective and elegant way of moving seriously in that direction. We argue further that, if knowing is important to acting, not all knowledge is effectively relevant to real transformation. Despite all its merits, the global goal framework offers direction and measurement standards but does not automatically penetrate all levels at which relevant knowledge for transformation is needed. This includes social and economic issues of poverty and development as well as the daunting challenges of climate change and natural resources depletion and degradation. We understand the need for metrics to compare various states of affairs and to negotiate desirable outcomes. It is important to distinguish between measures, statistics and reality, and to understand transformation as an extremely complex and hardly predictable process. We will look at those questions and other strategic issues in the next and last section on Africa, forests and the SDGs.

[20] From earlier drafts of the Framework Document.

Can Africa make it? A discussion of forests in the context of African emergence strategies

Forests are critical to Africa's sustainable development challenge. They are, to a significant extent, an indicator of how well Africa is addressing those challenges; they are also a measure of the historical and future stakes – global and regional – that surround them. In this third and last section of our discussion, we will look at the main features and thrusts of African forests and African forest policies in light of the trends, gaps and prospects of the sector in a post-2015 perspective. We will then examine and illustrate the themes that form the core of African emergence strategies for the next decade in order to establish relationships and draw inferences in relation with the SDGs framework and forests. Finally, we will look at critical questions of implementation and transformation affecting forests as well as other natural resources and development sectors, and discuss best practices and enabling conditions for achieving the inclusive green growth elements of Africa's transformational agenda.

African forests and forest policies



Map 1[21]. African Forested areas 2001



Map 2[22]. African Forested countries 2001

Basic structure and evolution of African forests

FAO (2011)[23] estimates that there were close to 675 million hectares of forest in Africa in 2010, accounting for about 17 per cent of global forest area and 23 per cent of the total land area in the region.

African forests form a diverse and dynamic mosaic of vegetation types undergoing continual changes largely owing to anthropogenic factors. This includes dry tropical forests and woodlands (most extensive), moist tropical forests in Western and Central Africa and mangroves in the coastal zones.

[21] See http://cdiac.ornl.gov/ftp/ndp055/ Users *of NDP-055, Tropical Africa: Land Use, Biomass, and Carbon Estimates for 1980* (Brown et al. 1996) should be aware of recent changes, effective March 2001. These changes are reflected in the file, ndp055.txt.
[22] See http://cdiac.ornl.gov/epubs/ndp/ndp055/ndp055.html Revised for the web 2001, Data 2000, Contributors: Sandra Brown, Greg Gaston, University of Illinois.
[23] FAO, 2011. *State of World's Forests 2011*. FAO, Rome.

Deciduous woodlands cover about 25 per cent of the continent (FAO, 2003[24], Temu 2012[25]). Only about 1.5 per cent of forests in Africa have been planted.

Figure 4: African forests in the diversity and in the world



Central Africa accounted for more than two-thirds (37 percent) of the total forest area, with the Congo basin being home to the second largest contiguous block of tropical rainforest after the Amazon (FAO, 2011). With 29 per cent of the regional forest cover, Southern Africa represented the second largest forest area, mainly of dry miombo woodlands. The disparity in types, abundance and quality of forest cover across the continent is worth noting. Five countries (Angola, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Sudan and Zambia) represented together more than half (55 per cent) of Africa's forests, next to large areas of arid and weakly forested areas, particularly in North, East and West Africa. Maps 1 and 2, Figure 4 and Table 1 provide a good illustration of this contrasted picture over time.

[24] FAO, 2003. *African forests: a view to 2020*. European Commission, African Development Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome.

[25] August Temu, 2012. *Future Forestry Sector Development in Africa* – http://www.ksla.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Future-Forestry-Sector-Development-in-Africa.pdf; see also Kowero, 2011. Climate change and African forests and tree resources: the stakes are enormous. Pp. 12-16 In Chidumayo, E., D. Okali, G. Kowero, M. Larwanou (eds). 2011. *Climate Change and African forest and wildlife resources*. African Forest Forum, Nairobi.

Table 1 also shows the evolution of deforestation rates in Africa over two decades: 1990-2000. and 2000-2010. Over those periods, deforestation rates that were reported in 2001[26] to be in the range of 0.80 per cent per annum and to account for about 56 per cent of the global reduction in forest cover seem to have fallen drastically to 0.49 per cent. However, a closer look at the figures considerably alters that picture while highlighting a key statistical constraint in the analysis of fine-grain forest and development issues in Africa.

Table 1: Forest area in Africa, 1990–2010[a]

Subregion	Area (1 000 ha)			Annual change (1 000 ha)		Annual change rate (%)	
	1990	2000	2010	1990–2000	2000–2010	1990–2000	2000–2010
Central Africa	268 214	261 455	254 854	-676	-660	-0.25	-0.26
East Africa	88 865	81 027	73 197	-784	-783	-0.92	-1.01
North Africa	85 123	79 224	78 814	-590	-41	-0.72	-0.05
Southern Africa	215 447	204 879	194 320	-1 057	-1 056	-0.50	-0.53
West Africa	91 589	81 979	73 234	-961	-875	-1.10	-1.12
Total Africa	749 238	708 564	674 419	-4 067	-3 414	-0.56	-0.49
World	4 168 399	4 085 063	4 032 905	-8 334	-5 216	-0.20	-0.13

a All tables and graphs showing trends are based on those countries which provided information for all points in time (1990, 2000, 2005 and 2010). More complete information on the status as of 2010 may be available for some variables. The annual change rate is the gain or loss in percent of the remaining forest area each year within the given period.

Source: State of the World Forests 2011 (SOFO 2011).

First, the deforestation figures provided by the State of the World Forests 2011 for the decade 1990-2000 (Table 1) are sharply different from those published at the time (2001) by FAO (0.56 per cent against 0.80 per cent in the earlier report). Second, the 2011 report provides an important detail: North Africa, in which forest loss dropped from 590,000 ha per year to just 41,000 ha per year, is the only African region that underwent a drop in its deforestation rates in the 2000-2010 period. Sudan's recent efforts to gather better annual data accounted mostly for the difference, because of much lower figures for 2000–2010 than those estimated for 1990–2000, based on fairly old data. Furthermore, nine countries, including the five with the largest forest areas, reported large losses in the decade ending in 2010. Finally, during the same period, Africa lost half a million hectares of primary forests per year as well as 1.9 million ha per year of 'other wooded land', that is 'areas with scattered tree growth too sparse to be defined as forest' but where the ecological and socioeconomic functions of trees are nonetheless important. 'The total area was more than 350 million hectares, corresponding to 31 per cent of the total area of other wooded land in the world' (FAO, 2011).

The structure of the African forest economy

Two essential questions must be answered before envisioning effective change pathways that can help forests contribute positively to post-MDGs development goals in Africa. One relates to policy and we will address it in the next sub-section. The other, which we will answer now, asks what is the basic structure of the African forest economy, and how is it contributing, or not contributing, to African development?

If we look at the performance of the African forest economy it can inform us about the structural contributions of forests to African economies and development goals. *The State of the World Forests 2014* (SOFO 2014[27]) has a welcome focus on the global forest economy. The regional data it provides allows for useful inferences on the structure – and structural weakness – of Africa's forest economy. Though based on earlier data, the *Forestry Outlook Study for Africa* (FOSA 2003[28]) is more detailed

[26] FAO. 2001. *Global Forest Resource Assessment 2000*. Main Report. FAO Rome; also reported in the Forestry Outlook Study for Africa (FOSA), see FAO, 2003, op. cited.
[27] FAO, 2014. *State of the World Forests 2014: Enhancing the socioeconomic benefits from Forests*. FAO, Rome
[28] FAO, 2003, op. cited.

and is particularly useful in confirming and complementing the 2014 structural information. The focus here is not on forest cover, deforestation and traditional forest management themes, but on the structure of the forest economy and its capacity to fulfill its development functions in countries that are typically poor and underdeveloped.

Table 2, below, from SOFO 2014, gives the gross value added (GVA) of the forest sector in Africa and other regions, that is, 'the sum of all revenue earned in the sector, less the cost of all purchases from other sectors', in 2011. It also gives the contribution of the forest sector to the economy (GDP) of these regions and the world. The most striking thing is that Africa, which has 17 per cent of the world's forests, including the second largest block of tropical rainforest, accounts for just 2.8 per cent (US$17 billion) of the global value added of the forest sector. Other regions do much better than Africa. Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), the second lowest contributor to global value added (GGVA), do almost three times better than Africa with just 5 per cent more forests. North America (17 per cent of the world's forests) contributes 17.3 per cent of GGVA; Europe (25 per cent of the world's forests) contributes 27.1 per cent, while Asia and the Pacific (18 per cent of the world's forests) accounts for almost 43 per cent of the global forest economy, the largest contributor by far.

Table 2 shows that, with just over US$600 billion GVA, forests account for less than one per cent of the world economy, while the forest sector percent share (~0.9) of regional GDPs is more or less the same across the five world regions. Together with regional shares of the forest economy, these facts expose the extreme weakness of Africa's global position in both the general economy and the forest sector.

Table 2 (SOFO 2014) - Value added in the forest sector and contribution to GDP in 2011, by region and sub-sector

Region	Gross value added in the forest sector (in billion US$ at 2011 prices)				Share of forest sector GVA in total GDP (%)			
	Forest	SWP	PP	Total	Forest	SWP	PP	Total
Africa	11	3	3	**17**	0.6	0.2	0.1	**0.9**
Asia and Oceania	84	66	111	**260**	0.3	0.3	0.5	**1.1**
Europe	35	61	68	**164**	0.2	0.3	0.4	**0.9**
North America	26	29	61	**115**	0.2	0.2	0.4	**0.7**
Latin America and Caribbean	14	12	24	**49**	0.3	0.2	0.4	**0.9**
World	169	170	266	**606**	0.3	0.3	0.4	**0.9**

Note: Forest = forestry and logging activities; SWP = sawnwood and wood-based panel production; PP = pulp and paper production.
Sources: UN (2012a), supplemented with national income account data from country sources.

As both Tables 2 and 3 indicate, the problem with the African forest economy is deep and structural. Africa barely exists in high value adding segments of the forest sector value chain and its share of global production sharply declines with greater degrees of processing.

Table 3 (FOSA 2003)

■ African forest products consumption compared with other regions – 2000 (per capita)
■ *Consommation comparée des produits forestiers, en Afrique et dans les autres régions – 2000 (par habitant)*

Product *Produits*	Africa *Afrique*	Europe *Europe*	North America *Amérique du Nord*	South America *Amérique du Sud*	Asia *Asie*	World *Monde*
Roundwood (m^3) *Bois ronds (en m^3)*	0.876	0.783	1.589	0.972	0.281	0.554
Woodfuel (m^3) *Bois de feu (en m^3)*	0.796	0.154	0.325	0.535	0.210	0.291
Industrial roundwood (m^3) *Bois rond industriel (en m^3)*	0.080	0.629	1.264	0.436	0.072	0.262
Sawnwood (m^3) *Sciages (en m^3)*	0.013	0.165	0.386	0.074	0.019	0.070
Wood-based panels (tonnes) *Panneaux dérivés du bois (en tonnes)*	0.003	0.088	0.132	0.026	0.014	0.032
Printing and writing paper (kg) *Papiers d'impression et d'écriture (en kg)*	1.8	42.0	68.0	10.0	8.0	16.0

Source: FAO, 2002a.

Successive FAO reports show that there has been no qualitative change in this situation over the decades. Africa doubled its wood production (including industrial roundwood and fuelwood) from 340 million m^3 to 690 million m^3 between 1980 and 2000 (FOSA 2003). In 2000, the average per capita roundwood consumption in Africa was substantially greater than the global average; it was more than 250 per cent of the Asian average and was higher than the European average. But this does not inform about the real value added to the economy. Not only was most wood exported as logs with very little value added, 91 per cent of all wood was also used as fuel (FOSA 2003). In 2010, the situation was still basically the same. Only 10 per cent of wood removals were used as industrial roundwood, with the rest used as fuelwood; and Africa accounted for 33 per cent of global fuelwood removals and only five per cent of global industrial wood removals (SOFO 2011).

SOFO 2014 portrays the same, unchanged reality, though in dollar terms, which is more directly significant to our discussion. In terms of value added, forestry and logging activities represent 65 per cent of the African forest economy but only 6.5 per cent of the global value added in that subsector. In addition, Africa's share in the value of forest processed products is barely existent, with only 1.76 per cent of sawn wood and wood-based panel industries and only 1.12 per cent of the pulp and paper subsector. Africa is, by far, the worst performer in all three forest subsectors. This is true even of the new rent-based global transfers related to climate change mitigation and environmental services. For instance, Africa benefits the least from Payments for Environmental Services (PES), with only 0.9 per cent of global payments in 2011. Other regions do six to 50 times better: China and the United States lead the combined 87 per cent dominance of their regions for PES payments, while LAC countries such as Costa Rica and Mexico do well but at a much smaller scale (calculated from SOFO 2014).

There is an important truth in these economic data. Africa is the only region where logging and forestry activities far outweigh in value (65 per cent) the production of processed forest goods. Everywhere else, the regional picture shows the reverse of the African situation. In other words, almost three-quarters or more of other regions' forest GVA is in value adding processing activities: for example, in Europe it is 79 per cent; North America, 78 per cent; LAC, 73 per cent; Asia and Oceania, 68 per cent. Because of the structural disabilities reflected in this negative picture, it is fair to say that the forest sector does not yet seriously contribute to African development.

The reasons this situation continues to be maintained are mostly known, but they are rarely brought forth in ways systematic enough to help open up meaningful wealth-creating pathways for the African forest economy. It is known that the way Africa consumes its wood, with the focus on fuelwood and low-

value exports, is an underdevelopment trap. It is known that most of Africa's logging sector is controlled by outside interests with extremely low investment in value-adding transformation. It is also known that most private African investments in the forest sector remain trapped in so-called 'informal' or 'illegal logging' activities, with little financial and strategic support to turn them into viable, sustainable, value-adding manufacturing and processing industries.

To this day, troves of forest riches remain hidden and untapped in low value, 'informal' non-wood forest products (NWFP) or non-timber forest products (NTFP) activities. SOFO 2014 estimates a global income of US$88 billion from non-wood forest products in 2011 (Table 4). But the global NTFP market is still quite undeveloped because of historical and economic factors that we will briefly discuss below in relation to policies. Its actual value is also widely underreported.

Table 4 (SOFO 2014) - Estimated income from the informal production of NWFPs in 2011

Region	Income (in million US$ at 2011 prices)			
	Medicinal plants	Animal-based NWFPs	Plant-based NWFPs	Total
Africa	52	3 165	2 082	**5 299**
Asia and Oceania	171	3 549	63 688	**67 408**
Europe	446	2 130	5 450	**8 026**
North America	0	1 016	2 627	**3 643**
Latin America and Caribbean	29	646	2 963	**3 638**
World	697	10 506	76 810	**88 013**

Sources: Medicinal plant data from the FRA 2010 (FAO, 2010) and other figures from FAOSTAT. Note that figures for medicinal plants are for the year 2005 (updated for inflation to 2011 prices) and the other figures are for 2011.

The production of plant-based NWFPs makes up the bulk (US$77 billion) of the global data. Medicinal plants are a separate category, generating an estimated US$700 million income, but this figure is updated from 2005 data and only includes income generated from the collection of raw materials for the production of medicines and not income generated further along the value chain. At the regional level, most of the income generated from the production of NWFPs appears in Asia and Oceania (US$67.4 billion or 77 per cent of the total). Europe and Africa have the next highest levels of income generation from these activities. Compared to the other activities in the forest sector, income from the production of NWFPs makes the greatest additional contribution to GDP in Asia and Oceania and in Africa, where they account for 0.4 per cent and 0.3 per cent of GDP respectively.

Unless structurally and forcefully addressed by African forest policies, this persistent combination of negative trends will represent a long-haul death sentence for the future of African forests. It would also act as a strongly negative signal about African capacity to address other similar structural handicaps that have so far prevented it from converging with other emerging developing nations. We will now look at the policy conditions that contribute to explaining the current situation.

African forest policies and the forest economy

Our key focus here is the relation of forest policies to African economic development. What have been the key African forest policy themes over time, and how much have they addressed, or failed to address, structural issues related to the economic contribution of forests to Africa's sustainable development?

Counsell (2009)[29] identified three externally driven 'forest paradigms' in Africa that 'have played a key role since colonial times in underpinning forest governance systems': industrial logging, biodiversity conservation, and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation of forests (REDD). REDD being postcolonial and fairly recent, we will look primarily at the first two policy themes because of their historical role in structuring the African forestry position. But there are, of course, many other paradigms that have contributed to shaping forest policies and economies. Three, in particular,

[29] Counsell, S., 2009. *Forest Governance in Africa*. Governances of Africa's Resources Programme, Occasional Paper No 50. South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg. See www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Forest_Governance_in_Africa.pdf

sustainability, participation and livelihood, must be considered for a more complete picture. Due to time constraints, we will not be able to address the policy implications of REDD+ and other climate-related programs. From the PES data already presented, we can infer that Africa is yet to fully benefit from these schemes; on the other hand, and in spite of large amounts of financing opportunities that these schemes represent, the jury is still out regarding their capacity to turn around by themselves the structural handicaps of the African forest economy. For the same reason, we will only be able to make cursory references in this subsection to the relation of forests to agriculture and rural-based industries, despite their enormous influence on forests and forest-related change.

We need to look at history first. Because of the later advent of participatory and climate-related paradigms, this brief historical background will only focus on concessions, conservation and the market conditions, particularly regarding NTFPs, which provided the foundations for forest policies in Africa.

Contemporary African forest economy is largely a colonial legacy. Historically, concessionary politics and fortress conservation[30] were key drivers that shaped the architecture of forested landscapes. A cornerstone of feudal tenures in Europe, the concessionary system 'naturally" evolved to become a major tool of European colonial expansion, as early as the 17th century with British and Dutch charter companies (Karsenty, 2009). Portugal established huge trading concessions in the 18th century to attract Portuguese settlers in Mozambique, and the King of Belgium, the infamous Leopold II[31], inaugurated the system in Central Africa at the end of the 19th century. France copied the system and established 40 massive territorial concessions over 700,000 km^2 covering some 78 per cent of the lands of present-day Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Congo and Gabon. This system of huge territorial concessions, encompassing all types of resources (except mines) as well as villages and towns, and in which private companies had state power of justice and policing, remained in place until 1929 (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1972[32]). In the meantime, around 1910, the concessions' exorbitant privileges had been curtailed; they had to give back parts of 'their' territories to the colonial state and to limit themselves to one product, either timber or rubber. In exchange, they were given full ownership of the land they chose (Karsenty, 2009). The first forest concessions were born around that time; they had huge powers in practice and, despite official restrictions, were not brought into respecting indigenous reservations or their formal obligations under the *cahier des charges* (*ibid*).

The year 1910 is also the time when large-scale commercial hunting organised by European commercial traders started appearing in Central Africa (Roulet & Hardin, 2009)[33]. It was a full part of the concession system established over vast expanses of forestlands declared 'vacant and without masters' and withdrawn from traditional communal controls. But it also coincided with the world expansion of protected areas following the Yellowstone model in the US. Most national parks in Africa were initially constituted as forest or game reserves. Originally inspired by American theological romanticism, the first modern parks were created in settler territories at the end of the 19th century (Diaw and Tiani, 2010[34]). This was a time when policies could be imposed by force, without true negotiation with natives. Sabie (Kruger) in South Africa and Amboseli in Kenya were established as early as 1892 and 1899 respectively. Other reserves were established in the 1920s and later within the framework of land ordinances, forest acts, laws and decrees targeting broader aspects of the relationship between natives and Europeans. This is the case, for instance, of the 1927 Land and Native Rights Ordinance in the British colony of Nigeria and of the law of 1 January 1924, which established the so-called regime of Indigenat in French African colonies (Diaw and Njomkap, 1998). In Cameroon, which underwent a triple – British, French and German – colonisation, reserves such as

[30] Hulme D. and M. Murphree (eds), 2001. *African wildlife and livelihoods: the promise and performance of community conservation*. James Currey Ltd, Oxford.
[31] Hochschild, Adam. 1998. King *Leopold's Ghost: a story of greed, terror, and heroism in colonial Africa*. Pan Macmillan, London.
[32] Coquery-Vidrovitch, C., 1972. *Le Congo au temps des grandes compagnies concessionnaires : 1898-1930*. Mouton and Co. Editions, Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris
[33] Pierre-Armand Roulet et Rebecca Hardin, 2009. Des domaines de chasse aux zones d'intérêt cynégétique à gestion communautaire, Pp 186-219 in Joiris, V. et P. Bigombe Logo (eds), *La gestion participative des forêts d'Afrique centrale*. Editions QUAE, Paris.
[34] Diaw, M.C. and Tiani, A.M. 2010. Fences in our Heads: A discourse analysis of the Korup resettlement stalemate. *Journal of Sustainable Forestry,* 29: 221-251.

Wazza (1934) and the Korup native administration forest reserve (1937) were basically created at the same time in the French and British parts of the country. The reclassification of reserves into national parks accelerated after the World War Two (Adams and Hulme, op. cited, 2001) and continued throughout the present time.

Thus, in Africa concessionary and conservation colonial policies became linked early in the 20th century. At that time in Europe, there were conflicting public demands on colonial authorities to develop the colonies and, at the same time, to intervene to avert the loss of a disappearing natural Eden. This found an outlet in the coupling of extractive reserves with 'virgin', 'inviolate' natural parks. Taken together, parks and productive forest reserves thus reconciled the tensions in the West between utilitarian and moral demands on nature to become the twin udders of the 'commercial and aesthetic dreams' of colonialism (Diaw, 2009[35]).

In an important review of international attitudes toward non-timber forest products, Sills *et al*. (2011[36]) make the case that many NTFPs were historically mainstream trade commodities, 'driving the fabled spice trade between Asia and Europe, expanding in the colonial period with products such as shea butter (*Vitellaria paradoxa*) and gum Arabic (*Acacia spp.*) from Africa, and feeding the industrial revolution with products such as rubber from the Amazon (*Heavea brasilenses*)'. After World War Two, the increased dominance of high-value timber exports from colonial concessions coupled with the rise of cheaper synthetic substitutes led to the decline of forest products such as gums, resins, fibers and medicines in both international trade and international policy discourse. FAO stopped collecting and publishing data on NTFPs in 1971, while NTFPs research became essentially descriptive and unconnected to strategic management or economic value options (ibid). Though forest products had remained central to the culture, knowledge system and economy of rural people in Africa and the tropics, they were increasingly seen as 'minor forest products'. They were neglected by government policies and, at worse, considered a necessary nuisance standing in the way of rational timber management and biodiversity conservation in properly administered concessions and parks.

Timber exploitation and trade, biodiversity conservation and NTFPs policies have all been subject to positive changes since those early times. In the aftermath of the drought and deforestation crises of the 1960s, and following increased concerns with poverty and social conflicts in the forest sector, social forestry and community forestry emerged in the 1970s to respond to deteriorating conditions in the forestry sector. In their wake a number of important themes gained prominence in the 1980s. Sustainability was brought to the forefront of environmental policies by the 1987 publication of the *Brundtland Report* and the 1992 UN Conference in Rio; 'biodiversity' was coined in 1988 by Edward Wilson, and 'non-wood products' the same year by Myers[37]; 'community conservation' emerged in those times to save parks from increased community disenchantment and encroachments; 'Model Forests', proposed by Canada at Rio 92, was brought forth as a method for bringing all those issues together under a landscape sustainability concept; 'participation', which already had long-standing, post-World War Two intellectual roots in action research, was a companion to all these policy changes and was institutionalised through various legal changes, participatory rural appraisal methods and environmental project interventions. This intellectual florescence entered the African policy scene in the 1990s and the year 2000.

There is, however, a major distinction to be made between this later stream of 'soft paradigms', as opposed to the bigger concessionary entitlements given logging and conservation interests. These latter, along with similar entitlements granted to mining or agro-industrial interests, not only defined the structure of rights to, and benefits from, the land, they also had the most influence in giving a direction to the forest economy as whole.

[35] Diaw, M.C., 2009. Elusive Meanings: Decentralization, Conservation and local Democracy. Pp 56-78 in German, L.A., Karsenty, A. and Tiani, A.M. *Governing Africa's Forests in a Globalized World*. Earthscan, London, Sterling VA.
[36] Sills, E., Shanley, P., Paumgarten, F. de Beer, J. and Pierce, A. 2011. Evolving Perspectives on Non-timber Forest Products. Pp. 23-51 in Shackleton S., Shackleton, C., Shanley, P. (eds.), *Non-Timber Forest Products in the Global Context*. Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg.
[37] See Diaw, op. cited, 2009, and Sills and col., op. cited, 2011.

One of the positive results from SOFO 2014 is that the size of biodiversity conservation areas in Africa has increased to 14 per cent of the African land mass. According to Roulet and Hardin (op. cited), game reserves covered 5.4 per cent of the continent in 2009, and 10 per cent of the land area in the 25 countries that support sport hunting. In countries such as Botswana, CAR, Tanzania and Zambia, such hunting concessions were granted for five, 10 and 15 years and represented next to 30 per cent of the national territory. This may be good for biodiversity conservation in globally defined terms, but how does it contribute to turning around the dismal economic results presented in Tables 1-3? Putting aside the undisputed importance of conserving forests and wildlife, and looking strictly at the performance of the economy from an MDG/post-2015 outlook, what can we show for the fundamental priorities given logging concessions and protected areas, decades after decades, in African forestry policies?

Riding the wave of the sustainability discourse, a surge of renewed interests for NTFPs was observed in the late 1980s. Sills *et al*. (op. cited) give a detailed and captivating account of the massive amount of literature and conferences dedicated to this rehabilitation. From a development perspective, however, there is a major flaw in the analyses that underlie the renewed interest for NTFPs. Mostly framed by traditional Western interests in the conservation of tropical forests, this renewal essentially scripted NTFPs as a backdrop or picture negative of older forests concerns: deforestation and idealised forest-dependent poverty. This should have been a time for looking beyond the low-value collection and trade of forest products. Instead, the research and debates were restricted by the search for a 'silver bullet' that would allow 'productive conservation of forests', saving them from logging and deforestation, while playing the role of an alleviating mechanism – a crutch – for poor people 'using simple technologies' that do not require forest destruction.

Thus, the structural transformational issues neglected in the case of wood processing were also passed by the new NTFP discourse. Africa was mostly absent from these discussions until several years after they had started. This, of course, did not facilitate any strategic rethink or policy uptake with more ambitious goals regarding the development of technologically advanced NTFP-based industries for food, medicine, cosmetics, fibers, and nutraceuticals. Not surprisingly, the renewed optimism about NTFPs attracted criticism after a few years, overwhelmingly, of course, from a narrow conservation perspective.

A recent report by CIFOR (Lescuyer *et al.,* 2014[38]) looks at the continuous financial viability of forest concessions in a context marked by increased competition for land, mainly from oil palm and rubber industries. Based on data collected in Cameroon and Congo, the report concludes that the financial profitability of agro-plantations is always superior (up to six times more profitable) to that of logging concessions. The latter remained less financially attractive, even under a scenario adding REDD+ benefits to sustainable logging revenues. Even cocoa plantations in Congo (but not in Cameroon) are currently doing better than logging concessions. This seriously puts in question the future of the concessionary model in African forestry. The question really is whether the inevitable changes will be a slow decline or whether they will be subject to bold policy anticipation allowing for viable and sustainable development pathways in the sector. The lack of attention to strategic developmental issues regarding the structure and performance of African forests has been a trademark of the literature, and has had lasting influence on forest policies and external interventions in this sector. This puts the responsibility of the strategic break needed squarely on the shoulders of African policymakers, in par with civil society and the scientific community.

The convergence for emergence in Africa

The Rio+20 declaration on Africa (Box 3) is an optimistic, forward-looking stance on Africa's future. This is reflective of the mood in most regional policy-making circles today, as well as in an increasingly large number of countries, which have set themselves up to achieving emergence in the early 2020s (for instance, Côte d'Ivoire and Rwanda) or mid-2030s (for instance, Cameroon and Senegal).

How can this be achieved and what will be the roles of various institutions, countries and actors? What are the strategies involved and how sound and realistic are they? What are the gaps and structural

[38] Lescuyer, G., J.N. Poufoun, A. Collin et R.I. Yembe Yembe, 2014. *Le REDD+ à la rescousse des concessions forestières? Analyse financière des principaux modes de valorisation des terres dans le bassin du Congo*. Document de Travail 160, CIFOR, Bogor.

issues still unanswered, and what can we do about them? How would forests fit, and how well do central African actors understand the forest stakes and their interrelation with core SDGs strategies for Africa? We will first look briefly at this nexus of questions before providing examples of strategies and practices to source for better forests contribution to real transformations in the lives of forest people and communities.

Box 3. 'The Future We Want": Africa at RIO+20

183. While we acknowledge that some progress has been made towards the fulfillment of international commitments related to Africa's development needs, we emphasize that significant challenges remain in achieving sustainable development on the continent.
184. We call on the international community to enhance support and fulfill commitments to advance action in areas critical to Africa's sustainable development and welcome the efforts by development partners to strengthen cooperation with the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). We also welcome the progress made by African countries in deepening democracy, human rights, good governance and sound economic management, and encourage African countries to continue their efforts in this regard. We invite all of Africa's development partners, in particular developed countries, to support African countries in strengthening human capacities and democratic institutions, consistent with their priorities and objectives with a view to furthering Africa's development at all levels, including through facilitating the transfer of technology needed by African countries as mutually agreed. We recognize the need for African countries to make continued efforts to create enabling environments for inclusive growth in support of sustainable development and for the international community to make continued efforts to increase the flow of new and additional resources for financing for development from all sources, public and private, domestic and foreign, to support these development efforts by African countries and welcome the various important initiatives established between African countries and their development partners in this regard.

16. (…) We also reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of the Istanbul Programme of Action for Least Developed Countries (IPOA), the Almaty Programme of Action for Landlocked Developing Countries, the Political declaration on Africa's development needs, and the New Partnership for Africa's Development…
105. We recognize that, three years from the 2015 target date of the MDGs, while there has been progress in reducing poverty in some regions, this progress has been uneven and the number of people living in poverty in some countries continues to increase, with women and children constituting the majority of the most affected groups, especially in least developed countries and particularly in Africa.

The Afro-pessimism-optimism pendulum: What future for Africa in the years 2040?

At the beginning of the 1990s, Sub-Saharan Africa outside South Africa made less than one per cent of world trade. An article in *Le Monde* newspaper told the mood of the day: if all sub-Saharan Africa, except South Africa, were to disappear, the world would not feel the tremor. In the late 1990s, Africa began to stir from the stupor of its two 'lost decades'. Unnoticed at first, this movement took place slowly and held, rising to an annual growth rate of 4.9 per cent between 2000 and 2008, and bouncing back to the same levels after a short dip in 2009 following the global financial crisis.

The significance of the African growth was particularly recognised during the gloom of the post-crisis slowdown in developed economies. Since then, a surge of afro-optimism, tempered by a few naysayers, has gripped analysts and media commentators of a continent cast to become the 'investment Eldorado' of the coming decades. Though negative media reporting of African wars, instability, corruption and HIV/Ebola epidemics take a much bigger space in the public's mind than good news about Africa, this latter must still be looked at carefully and with a cool head.

Lions on the Move[39], the 2010 Africa report of the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), was a marker in reconsidering Africa's changing position in the global economy. The report compared the rising African economy to the fabled Asian economic tigers and sought to examine the sources behind Africa's growth acceleration since 2000. It looked at future growth prospects and most compelling business opportunities, while analysing the challenges and opportunities facing different groups of countries. MGI found that with a collective African GDP of US$1.6 trillion in 2008, roughly equal to those of Brazil or Russia, the African growth is more than an effect of the commodity boom (about one-fourth of the GDP) and has real staying power. In 2000-2008, Africa's growth was widespread across sectors, with banking, retail, telecom and construction flourishing, agriculture growing at 5.5 per cent, and direct foreign investment (FDI) reaching a record high of US$62 billion in 2008 (compared to US$9 billion in 2000). As noted previously by the IMF's 2008 Outlook on Sub-Saharan Africa, the continued growth of FDI partly cushioned the price shock that triggered 'hunger revolts' in several African countries and was diversified. 'For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar are profiting from FDI in mining, Kenya from FDI in telecommunications, and Senegal from FDI in infrastructure and tourism'[40].

Figure 5. (from MGI, 2010)



The MGI report also projected that Africa's combined consumer spending of US$860 billion in 2008 – more than India or Russia – will likely rise to 1.4 trillion in 2020. Fuelled by its good demographics (Figure 6), its massive store of resources and the growth of four key sectors (Figure 5), the African economy was also projected to be worth more than US$2.6 trillion in 2020.

This upbeat picture of the African growth story is confirmed by more recent reports. *The Africa Competiveness Report 2013*[41] celebrates the surge of interest in Africa 'as an investment destination of choice and as a region marked by greater prosperity and development'. Looking at the quality of the high growth episode of sub-Saharan Africa, a recent IMF working paper (Martinez and Mlachila, 2013[42]) found that the African growth was not fragile, as some feared. Despite uneven improvement in social indicators, it was real and strong, both in GDP and GDP per capita; it was quite broad-based geographically, including low- and middle-income countries, less volatile than in the previous 15 years, and accompanied by productivity improvements. Gross investment also played a role in explaining the growth path after 1995.

The African Economic Outlook (AEO) for 2013[43] confirms this positive analysis and the steady economic progress of African economies:

[39] Roxburgh, Charles *et al*., 2010. *Lions on the Move: The progress and potential of African economies*. McKinsey Global Institute, McKinsey & Company.
[40] IMF, 2008. *Regional Economic Outlook 08, Sub-Saharan Africa*. World Economic and Financial Surveys, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
[41] *The Africa Competiveness Report 2013*. World Economic Forum, African Development Bank, Denmark and The World Bank, World Economic Forum, Geneva
[42] Martinez, M. and M. Mlachila, 2013. *The Quality of the Recent High-Growth Episode in Sub-Saharan Africa*. WP/13/53, International Monetary Fund, Washington, DC.
[43] *African Economic Outlook 2013: Structural Transformation and Natural Resources*. African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, United Nations Development Programme and Economic Commission for Africa

"We find that over the last decade greater stability, sound macroeconomic policies, improved terms of trade and blossoming partnerships with emerging economies have widened the economic policy space of African policymakers: African nations are freer than ever to choose their own development paths. Indeed, the continent's economic outlook for 2013 and 2014 is promising, confirming its healthy resilience to internal and external shocks and its role as a growth pole in an ailing global economy. Africa's economy is projected to grow by 4.8 per cent in 2013 and accelerate further to 5.3 per cent in 2014. The main sources of dynamism are expected to be the expansion of agricultural production, robust growth in services and a rise in oil production and mining. This relatively broad-based pattern of growth will be underpinned by the continued increase of external financial flows and resurgence in domestic demand driven by consumption and investment."

None of these reports, however, fails to consider the critical limitations and challenges still faced by African economies and the enormous difficulties that African countries and governments will have addressing them. Those include structurally weak foundations in critical areas as well as major differences in the position of different countries and categories of countries. We will first look briefly at the current responses of selected countries and regional programs, before coming back to these structural questions and their strategic importance for post-2015 African prospects.

Figure 6: Africa's Rising Demographic



Graphic courtesy of the Allianz Knowledge Site, http://knowledge.allianz.com/?815

What are African governments doing? Africa's transformation plans

African leaders and regional bodies are fully aware of the opportunities opening up to move their countries closer to transformation. There is a marked difference from previous eras in the way they are planning and moving to address both the opportunities and the challenges. The turn-around started in the mid-late 1990s. Emerging developing nations, unhindered by post-colonial blinders and driven by their quest for resources and markets to sustain their own growth, were the first to take notice. China's infrastructure investment in Sub-Saharan Africa overtook the World Bank's in 2005 and has grown larger ever since. The new context allowed Africans to diversify their partnerships and develop more confident investment and trade relationships with other developing nations (Figure 7).

Trade with other developing countries accounts for more than half of sub-Saharan Africa's trade

Composition of sub-Saharan Africa's trade by trading partner, 1990–2008



SOURCE: International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade Statistics; McKinsey Global Institute

The establishment of the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in 2001 was a landmark. NEPAD was a merger of the 'Renaissance' and 'Omega' plans by former presidents Thabo Mbeki and Abdoulaye Wade, with Algeria, Libya and Nigeria joining South Africa and Senegal in spearheading this continental recovery plan. The Plan was endorsed by the G8, China and other development partners and became the economic program of the African Union when the latter replaced the old Organisation of African Unity in 2002.

NEPAD's four primary objectives are to eradicate poverty, promote sustainable growth and development, integrate Africa in the world economy, and accelerate the empowerment of women; but its major emphasis from the beginning was to develop African infrastructure to support such processes. NEPAD commits Africa to principles of good governance, democracy, human rights and conflict resolution as standards for an environment conducive to increased investment and capital flows and long-term growth. It seeks to be an Africa-owned foundation for partner-based regional development and has developed a number of active support programs in that perspective (Box 4).

At the beginning of this decade several African countries firmed up their development strategies toward inclusive green growth paths supported by emergence or transformation plans. Most have been moving away from older poverty reduction strategic papers, which had yielded little or no fruits, thereby forcing them to rethink their growth strategies. The African Union (UA) and its various arms and programs, the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (UNECA) have played an important role in facilitating this process. In Tables 5 and 6 (below) we give a sample description of these regional programs and country plans. They all strive to address development issues and to create conditions for sustaining current growth trends in a way that includes the poorest segments of society and reduces internal sources of social tensions and disinfranchisement.

Box 4. NEPAD's Programs (2014)

Agriculture and Food Security
- CAADP
- TerrAfrica
- Fertilizer Support Programme
- Fisheries
- Rural Futures
- African Biosciences Initiative

Climate Change and National Resource Management
- Environment
- Energy
- Water

Regional Integration and Infrastructure
- ICT
- Transport
- Energy
- Water

Human Development
- Education and Training
- Science and Technology
- NEPAD Biosafety (ABNE)
- Health
- African Science, Technology and Innovation Indicators (ASTII)
- Africa Medicines Regulatory Harmonization (AMRH)
- ABI
- Research for Health - Africa (R4HA)

Economic and Corporate Governance
- African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

Cross-cutting Issues (Gender & Capacity Development)
- Gender
- ICT
- Capacity development

Table 5. African institutions' strategic emergence plans

Institution	Strategy Means of implementation
African Union Commission Source: Website **Name of strategic document** *Strategic plan 2009-2012* **Vision/area of action** "An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena."	Assessment of internal and external environment (Political, Economic, Socio-cultural, Technological, Legal and Ecological); Analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT); Comparative strategic analysis; Strategic pillars: ▪ Peace and security ▪ Development ▪ Integration and cooperation ▪ Shared values ▪ Institution and capacity building Sensitization forum; Comprehensive Annual Work Plans and Budgets (AWPBs); Staff individual Work Plans For each activity, the Commission has developed suitable outputs in respective departmental Work Plans for effective monitoring and evaluation.
CAADP – The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program Source: Website **Name of strategic document**	Overall, CAADP's goal is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty through agriculture. To do this, African governments have agreed to increase public investment in agriculture by a minimum of 10 per cent of their national budgets and to raise agricultural

Institution	Strategy Means of implementation
The CAADP Four Pillars **Vision/area of action** CAADP is NEPAD'S agricultural programme whose goal is to advance agriculture and food security. By 2015, African leaders hope to see: - Dynamic agricultural markets within and between countries and regions in Africa; - Farmers being active in the market economy and the continent becoming a net exporter of agricultural products; - A more equitable distribution of wealth for rural populations; - Africa as a strategic player in agricultural science and technology; and - Environmentally sound agricultural production and a culture of sustainable management of natural resources in Africa. Rwanda became the first country to sign the CAADP Compact 2007. As of May 2011, 26 countries had signed the compact and incorporated the CAADP Compact into their agricultural agenda. These countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, DRC, Tanzania, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Go to http://www.caadp.net/library-country-status-updates.php for the full listing.	productivity by at least 6 per cent. This is to be done through CAADP's strategic functions, regional and economic communities, national roundtables and four key Pillars. The four CAADP Pillars Pillar 1 - Extending the area under sustainable land management Pillar 2 - Improving rural infrastructure and trade-related capacities for market access Pillar 3 - Increasing food supply and reducing hunger Pillar 4 - Agricultural research, technology dissemination and adoption CAADP Multi-donor Trust Fund Since CAADP emerged in 2003, development partners have worked together closely to support its processes and the development of the CAADP Pillars. This collaborative effort has resulted in a significant harmonization of donor support for CAADP activities and investment programs. NEPAD, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the African Union (AU), together with a number of donors and African governments, worked to further harmonize support. The result is the CAADP Multi-donor Trust Fund, hosted at the World Bank. The CAADP Multi-donor Trust Fund is a flexible yet systematic, efficient and reliable way to: • Harmonize priorities • Allow economies of scale • Increase the efficiency and effectiveness of financial resources • Target specific gaps in financing, capacity and technology • Facilitate partnerships & coalition building among African institutions, partners and donors • Complement existing resources mobilized around CAADP Pillars and other priorities Countries are encouraged to incorporate the CAADP objectives into their agricultural and rural development strategies. As part of the implementation process countries are subjected to an independent review process to ensure the goals of the CAADP and the needs of the country are both met.
African Development Bank (ADB) Source:website **Name of strategic document** *AfDB strategic plan for 2013-2022* **Vision/area of action** It charts the way towards inclusive growth that spans age, gender and geography, and takes special account of Africa's fragile states, which are home to 200 million people, as well as building climate	It charts the way towards inclusie growth that spans age, gender and geography The Strategy identifies the five main channels through which the Bank will deliver its work and improve the quality of growth in Africa. They are: infrastructure development, regional economic integration, private sector development, governance and accountability, skills and technology. The new strategy will also seek new and creative ways of mobilizing resources to support Africa's transformation, especially by leveraging its own

Institution	Strategy Means of implementation
resilience, and the sustainable management of natural resources	resources. Wider use of public-private partnerships, co-financing arrangements and risk-mitigation instruments will draw in new investors.
UNECA Source:website **Name of strategic document** *Strategic and program directions 2010 – 2015* **Vision/area of action** Policy research and knowledge delivery. The period 2010-2015 is a vision of the Institute as the pre-eminent and acknowledged site in Africa for advanced capacity development and renewal in economic development, management and planning for midcareer and senior policy makers at the national, sub-regional and regional levels.	IDEP will be investing itself in generating a corpus of knowledge around questions of development, economic management, and planning; knowledge which will, ***inter alia***, feed into and underpin its capacity development and training activities. Undertaking aggressive program outreach activities across the African continent designed to bring it in closer contact with key policy makers in Member States; The Institute will take steps to introduce programmes designed to reach policy communities in the legislative arm of government, the sub-regional cooperation and integration agencies, regional institutions such as the African Union (AU), and the burgeoning civil society that has become a key feature of the policy and decision making terrain of most African countries.

Table 6. Selected examples of country strategies

Countries	Strategy Means of implementation
Senegal Portail du government (web) **Name of strategic document** *Plan stratégique Senegal Emergent a l'horizon 2035* **Vision/area of action** Encourage economic growth with considerable impact on human development	Consolidate what it has acquired that is democratic governance and re-examine its priorities with the hope to ensure a sustainable political, economic and social stability of the country. Investment in sectors that will stimulate sustainable development. This calls for the participation of all actors as well as fund-raising from the public-private sector (internal and external) Senegal opted for a national strategy on economic and social development for the period of 2013-2017. This is the consensual framework in charge of coordinating public interventions. The Plan d'Action Prioritaire 2014-2018 is the document of reference for actions carried out by the government, technical and financial partners, public-private partnership and the population medium-dated.
Ethiopia Source: Wikipedia-growth and transformation plan **Name of strategic document** Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2010-2015 **Vision/area of action** Ethiopia's goal of achieving middle income status by 2025	Encourage large-scale foreign investment opportunities, primarily in the agricultural and industrial sectors. Complete Ethiopia's membership in the World Trade Organization. Provide basic infrastructure in four industrial cluster zones. Renew focus on natural resource and raw material industries such as gold, oil, gas, potash, and gemstones. Increase road networks by 10,000 miles throughout the country. Build a 1,500 mile-long standard gauge rail network and create manufacturing plants for locomotive engines and railway signaling systems. Quadrupling power generation from 2,000 to 8,000 megawatts, Seek investment in renewable energy projects Increase mobile telephone subscribers Achieve a sustainable increase in agricultural productivity and production Accelerate agriculture commercialization and agro-industrial development Reduce degradation and improve productivity of natural resources

<table>
<tr><th>Countries</th><th>Strategy
Means of implementation</th></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>Achieve universal food security and protect vulnerable households from natural disasters
The Agricultural Transformation Agency's programs are designed to help all partners meet the targets.
- Enhance productivity and production of smallholder farmers and pastoralists
- Strengthen marketing systems
- Improve participation and engagement of the private sector
- Expand the amount of land under irrigation
- Reduce the number of chronically food-insecure households[1]</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Rwanda
Source: GGGI website

Name of strategic document
The Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) 2013-2018

Vision/area of action
Green Growth Planning and Implementation put in place by the Global Green Growth Institute-Rwanda (GGGI) since 2012
The objective of GGGI Rwanda program is to support the government of Rwanda (GoR) to develop secondary cities as model green cities with green economic opportunities.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Cameroon
Source: DSCE

Name of strategic document
Document stratégique pour la croissance et l'emploi

Vision/area of action
Cameroon: emerging country, democratic and unified in diversity</td><td>Growth strategy
• Infrastructures;
• Modernize promising sectors;
• Human development;
• Regional integration and diversification of trade.
Employment strategy
• Descent jobs;
• Reduce the demand for employment;
• Re-examine the market efficiency.
Strategic management of the State (governance)
• Strengthen public governance;
• Set up a framework that renders the State more visible and present in the field.
Means of implementation and monitoring
• Institutional framework;
• Operational framework;
• Reports;
• Include the National Institute of Statistics in the process.</td></tr>
</table>

There is a common thread in all these action plans. Their visions converge towards creating structural conditions for growth, human development and prosperity, strengthening governance, and forcefully addressing hunger and food security with agricultural transformation at the centre of the agenda. The plans all give primacy to internal conditions while working to attract foreign investments; they take a pluralistic stance toward social actors other than the State and include implementing actions enumerated in the strategic papers. But have these plans been working? We have already seen half the story with the growth performance. External assessements of the region's structural conditions will help answer the other half. It will also help us identify the scope and nature of the challenges for Africa and the most pressing tasks in a post-2015 perspective.

Filling the inclusive growth gap: an agenda for African transformation

The 2010 and 2013 Africa reports already cited, as well an additional report from MGI in 2012[44] and *Africa's Pulse* 2014[45] from the World Bank, all recognise important uncertainties and vulnerabilities in the future of the African economy. There are conditions Africa needs to fulfil to be able to capitalise on its potential. The first takes into account the qualitative position and the difference between countries and categories of countries. In real life, two per cent growth points do not mean the same thing from the standpoint of, say, South Korea, and that of Senegal trying to catch up from 40 years lost on the former country after the two started diverging in the mid-1960s. On the continent also, a 'competiveness divide' is appearing among countries; 14 out of the 20 least competitive economies are in Africa. *The Africa Competitiveness Report 2013* mentions a 'tale of two Africas', which brings to mind our earlier discussion of the 'bottom billion' and associated development traps.

Lions on the Move (MGI 2010) and *The Africa Competiveness Report 2013* provide useful, though different, categorisation of individual countries. The McKinsey Institute sees economic diversification – including growth of manufacturing and services – and exports, boosted to finance investment, as key to historical growth paths. It is the basis on which they classify African countries into four broad clusters:



NOTE: We include countries whose 2008 GDP was approximately $10 billion or greater, or whose real GDP growth rate exceeded 7% over 2000–08. We exclude 22 countries that accounted for 3% of African GDP in 2008.
SOURCE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; World Bank World Development Indicators; McKinsey Global Institute

diversified economies, oil exporters, transition economies and pre-transition economies (Figure 8). The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has developed with its AfDB and World Bank partners a 12 pillars Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) framework that seeks to identify the drivers of productivity, or 'the set of institutions, policies and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country'. This is important for Africa, in which high growth levels have not yet translated into the change of living standard experienced by other countries with similar growth rates. On this basis, the GCI 12 pillars are divided into three groups each yielding a certain type of economic structure: (i) 'basic requirements', such as infrastructures and institutions', which are key to *factor-driven economies*; (ii) 'efficiency enhancers', including higher education and training, technological readiness and financial markets

[44] MGI, 2012. *Africa at work: Job creation and Inclusive Growth*. The McKinsey Global Institute, McKensey & Co.
[45] The World Bank, 2014. *Africa's Pulse: an analysis of issues shaping Africa's economic future*. Vol 9, April 2014.

development, which are key to *efficiency-driven economies;* and (iii) 'innovation and (business) sophistication factors' that are key to *innovation-driven economies* (see Table 7).

Table 7: African economies by stages of development

Stage	African countries	Other countries in this stage	Important areas for competitiveness
Stage 1 (factor-driven) GDP per capita < US$2,000	Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe	Bangladesh, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Vietnam, Yemen	Basic requirements (60 percent), efficiency enhancers (35 percent), and innovation factors (5 percent)
Transition from 1 to 2 GDP per capita US$2,000 to US$3,000	Algeria, Botswana, Egypt, Gabon, Libya	Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Brunei Darussalam, Iran, Islamic Rep., Venezuela	Basic requirements (between 40 percent and 60 percent), efficiency enhancers (between 35 percent and 50 percent), and innovation factors (between 5 percent and 10 percent)*
Stage 2 (efficiency-driven) GDP per capita US$3,000 to US$9,000	Cape Verde, Mauritius, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland	Albania, Belize, China, Costa Rica, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico	Basic requirements (40 percent), efficiency enhancers (50 percent), and innovation factors (10 percent)
Transition from 2 to 3 GDP per capita US$9,000 to US$17,000	Seychelles	Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Croatia, Malaysia, Mexico, Russian Federation, Turkey	Basic requirements (between 20 percent and 40 percent), efficiency enhancers (50 percent), and innovation factors (between 10 percent and 30 percent)*
Stage 3 (innovation-driven) GDP per capita > US$17,000		Germany, Republic of Korea, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom, United States	Basic requirements (20 percent), efficiency enhancers (50 percent), and innovation factors (30 percent)*

Source: World Economic Forum, 2012.
Note: Countries with a share of mineral exports in their total exports greater than 70 percent are moved toward a lower stage of development.

Development is an extremely complex process and, as such, can never be predicted. Uncertainty and surprise are inherent to it, as shown by the unexpectedly large impact of US Federal Reserve Chair's 'tapering talk' in the summer of 2013 on emerging markets that had the best fundamentals[46] (See Box 5). Nevertheless, both MGI and GCI frameworks try to address the issue of structural transformation and allow for useful strategising and prioritising according to a country's relative position regarding variables such as productivity, infrastructure, technological readiness or innovation, for instance. There are some differences between the two classification systems, but they are valuable tools for strategic analysis and decision-making, particularly when taken together.

Box 5. The effect of the Federal Reserve's 'tapering talk' on emerging markets

Late last spring, Federal Reserve officials began hinting at coming cutbacks to what was then an $85 billion per month bond-buying program aimed at spurring stronger economic growth. With the U.S. recovery improving, Fed officials indicated they would soon start scaling back, or "tapering," the bond purchases.

This rising possibility slammed markets worldwide, but developing markets took some of the biggest tumbles. Money that had poured in seeking high-yielding investments in riskier economies drained out.

Did emerging market nations with good policies, strong international capital positions, and healthy government budgets navigate the shift better? No. In a study of a 27 emerging-market countries, the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) found that nations they considered to be the best economic and financial performers got the biggest walloping. The authors argue the hardest hit countries have been punished, in a sense, for having been such an attractive place to invest during times of ample liquidity. South Africa was in that group, dubbed the "fragile five", along with Turkey, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/03/17/taper-talk-slammed-strong-emerging-nations-most/

[46] See http://www.voxeu.org/article/fed-tapering-and-emerging-markets
http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/03/17/taper-talk-slammed-strong-emerging-nations-most/
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-13/bernanke-s-tapering-talk-backfires-amid-bond-yield-surge.html

From Figure 8, we can clearly see that Sierra Leone, for instance, which has had the highest growth rates in the world (up to 16 per cent) over the past few years, is still far behind in terms of economic diversification – that is, manufacturing and services – size of the economy, market development, technological readiness and many other indicators of structural development readiness. It can also be noted that forest-rich countries in the samples – including Angola, Cameroon, Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia and Sierra Leone – are very much 'factor-driven', with low productivity, and weakly diversified (with the relative exception of Cameroon).

Figure 9: Africa's performance in regional comparison



Source: World Economic Forum, 2012.

Note: The sample includes Africa: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe; Southeast Asia: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam; Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

That structural weakness is particularly glaring in the case of the richer high oil exporters, which are the least diversified. Their position brings to mind the risks of 'Dutch disease' – when a country's natural resource exports result in a weaker manufacturing or agriculture sector - and the type of resource-rich, small country entrapment feared by Collier.

Then, what should African countries do to transform their current growth dynamics into sustained development? There can hardly be a silver bullet or a one-size-fit-all solution to this question, but a few points can be made. Figure 9 illustrates the GCI problem areas to be addressed – differently and at different paces – by African countries.

The World Economic Forum has compared Africa's performance with Southeast Asia as benchmark for a large number of African economies. As alluded to earlier, the two regions had similar GDP per capita profiles in the 1960s before diverging spectacularly thereafter. Figure 9 shows that, on average, Africa's economic foundations remain consistently weaker than Southeast Asia's across all GCI competitiveness pillars. The most pronounced deficits include key structural conditions, such as higher education and training, technological readiness, innovation (in par with LAC), market size and infrastructure. Considering just the last two, today the opportunity cost of bad roads, bad logistics and power outages is high for businesses, whether indigenous or foreign, operating in Africa. In return, these costs impact negatively on the regional integration and market size of African economies, taking away the advantage and economies of scale they should have had from rising demographics and increased consumer spending. The McKinsey Institute (MGI 2012, op. cited) notes, for instance, that:

"It costs more than $10,000 to move a single 20-foot container overland from Dakar, Senegal, to Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, a distance of about 2,000 kilometres, passing no fewer than 55

checkpoints that can impose unpredictable delays and add between 11 and 17 days to shipping time. To move a similar container the same distance in China would be roughly $2,300 by road or $1,000 by rail. In Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, which have some of the busiest ports in West Africa, the process of completing import procedures and clearing a port can take between 35 to 40 days."

Despite these hurdles, Africa has remained a prime destination for foreign direct investment (FDI), which expanded more than 30-fold in Sub-Saharan Africa in the past 20 years, nearly 10 times faster than global GDP. Driven by investment demand and private consumption, FDI inflows to the region (more than 16 per cent in 2013) were boosted by hydrocarbon discoveries in many countries but were also directed by 30 per cent to the domestic market in the form of manufacturing and services projects, including in telecom, banking and transport (*Africa's Pulse* 2014, op. cited). This is another area requiring strategic attention from African decision-makers. *Africa's Pulse* warns that African countries should look beyond the immediate benefits of investment and employment to get the most out of FDI. This means understanding the functioning of global value chains in order 'to capture the productivity-enhancing 'spillovers' of knowledge and technology.' Citing recent research, the authors further suggest that:

"The experience in Sub-Saharan Africa on achieving FDI spillovers has been largely disappointing. At the heart of the problem is that linkages between foreign investors and local economies — especially through supply chains — have remained limited in Africa. But there are some important differences hidden in the aggregate story. First, some sectors may have greater potential for integration than others… While foreign investors purchase virtually no inputs from domestic suppliers in the apparel sector, local supply relationships are more extensive in mining and (not surprisingly) much more in agribusiness [Figure 10]. One of the main reasons for differences across sectors (especially between mining and apparel) relates to the sourcing strategies of foreign investors in the context of their global supply and production networks. In the apparel sector, local management in African host countries has very limited power over sourcing decisions, most of which are made by parent companies or by global buyers like Walmart and The Gap, which specify what and from whom to source fabric, buttons, and zippers. In mining, by contrast, most of the decision-making power rests with local management, although here, too, global procurement is increasingly encroaching [Figure 11]. One positive feature of these findings is that, even in the apparel sector, foreign investors source the large majority of inputs locally (rather than importing them); it is just that often these are sourced from other foreign investors. This means that while local ownership does not increase, local jobs are still created. It also means there may be scope for local firms to take over these supply relationships in time."

FIGURE 10: Distribution of inputs by sourcing location



In short, the good news about African growth and African attractiveness to foreign investments and markets must be matched with articulated and systematic moves to enhance the diversity, productivity, competiveness and novelty of African economies and to occupy high value-added niches and segments of domestic and regional value chains. This means strengthening African integration and African institutions, as well as their technical and strategic capabilities – a bold but imperative agenda that we will now revisit in relation to the forest sector.

FIGURE 11: Location of sourcing decision making



Forests and the inclusive growth gap: scenarios for transformation

As with the rest of the economy, the African forest sector needs its structural transformation. This has come clearly out of the analysis of its negligible value added to the global economy, of the inverted nature of its investments – in primary production rather than higher value adding segments of the industry – and of the historical forces and policies that have contributed to shaping its long-standing underperformance. In environmental terms, deforestation is as bad as ever; in social terms, the industry has islets of relative prosperity amidst a sea of subsistence-level lifestyles. Forests have not contributed in any noticeable way to the African growth story. This is in addition to its negligible share in global manufacturing, which mirrors the position of the African economy as a whole (just over one per cent). The status quo, however comfortable it might be to a long-distance observer, is not an option. It has become clear that development and sustainability in the sector will remain empty promises without economic re-foundation. How this can be done in ways that create durable wealth without jeopardising forests' natural capital and the related web of complex socio-ecological processes extending far beyond forests, is very much an open question. How this relates to SDG negotiations in New York about a new framework for sustainable development is also part of the equation – though not all of it by far.

In the two last subsections of this paper, we will look at the extent to which the proposed goal framework responds to the issues raised by the inverted economic profile of the forest sector and its weak contribution to the African economy. We will consider the environmental performance of the African economy in the process. We will also explore the views of some African organisations and experts regarding possible future scenarios for sustainable development in the forest sector. We will finish by considering ground-level innovations and transformational initiatives.

Revisiting the goal framework from the perspective of transformational change

Seen from Africa, at least, the disconnect between the position of forests in the current goal framework and the transformational perspective we aim to outline seems obvious. Despite the late but welcome incorporation of forests as an explicit component of Goal 15, the latter remains cast within narrow conservation/sustainable use terms, decoupled from core African structural transformation and inclusive green growth strategies. This is problematic. The place and role of forests should be integral to those strategies, which, in turn, must chart a wealth-creating pathway that gives value to standing natural and

planted forests to the benefit of the people living in those environments. This is a time for reinventing a new economy from the ashes of slash and burn industrialisation, but that economy must still produce value and wealth for the people. The goal framework, as it stands, does not go enough in that direction with regards to forests and ecosystems.

Figure 12, though extremely simplified, outlines what we regard as the desired strategic relationship for such transformational agenda at the level of macroeconomic and social policies. Box 6 provide more details on what we see as core African strategies for better SDG outcomes, while Box 7 positions forests and terrestrial ecosystems in relation to facilitating conditions that are all important to forests. Their import and influence, however, go well beyond forests. They are integral to transformational strategies that must foster inclusive societies and institutions and struggle to obtain an international environment more conducive to African and LDCs development than in the past. In both boxes, we identify a few important missing links. For example, Goal 3 on healthy lives fails to make the link between health and nutrition as well as health and productivity. As a consequence, it also fails to even envision the huge contribution natural plants and forests could make to healthy lives and healthier production systems – that is, more equitable, more productive and more sustainable. The relation of forests to structural transformation is, of course, completely absent, as well as its central interaction with agriculture and mining, for instance.

To be able to respond to the development demands of the poorest forest economies, there is a need to move away from a closed-box view of the environment as mostly an environmental problem. Instead, we may have to answer the late Jacques Weber and Robert Barbault's call for 'an ecological revolution of the economy'[47].

Figure 12. The strategic relationship



[47] Barbeau, and J. Weber, 2010. *La vie quelle enterprise ! Pour une revolution écologique de l'économie*.

Box 6. CORE AFRICAN STRATEGIES

Structural Transformation and Inclusive Green growth

Goal 8. Inclusive and sustainable growth, full productive and decent jobs
8.2 productivity diversification, innovation
8.3 Decent job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation,
formalization and growth of micro-, small-and medium-sized enterprises,
including through access to financial services
8.4 Decouple economic growth from environmental degradation
8.9 sustainable tourism that creates jobs + culture and products
8.10 Strengthen domestic financial institutions

Goal 9. Resilient infrastructure, inclusive sustainable industrialization and innovation
9.1 Sustainable and resilient infrastructure, regional transborder infrastructure + 9.4
9.2 Inclusive and sustainable industrialization
9.3 Access of small-scale industrial and other to financial services, affordable credit,
and their integration into value chains and markets

Goal 7. Affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern? energy
Target 7.2-7.b. Investments in renewable energies, + infrastructure and technology

Goal 2. food security and sustainable agriculture
2.3 By 2030, double the agricultural productivity and incomes of small-scale food producers
Through access to land, productive resources, inputs, knowledge, financial services,
markets and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment
2.4 Sustainable food production systems and resilient agricultural practices that increase
Productivity, maintain ecosystems, strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change
2.a Invest in rural infrastructure, agricultural research and extension services, technology
development and plant and livestock gene banks to enhance agricultural productive capacity

Major gap: No specific forest-related target on Structural transformation and inclusive green growth

Key Strategic Inputs to Structural Transformation Education and Health

Goal 4. inclusive quality education and life-long learning
Target 4.3. to 4.7 vocational, technical & university training, skills for SD

Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all
Key dimensions of health for development are missing from an African perspective, particularly regarding the relation of nutrition to health, health to a productive workforce and forests' (dry and humid) potentially huge contributions to healthy nutrition (neutraceuticals) and natural medicines. Those are also missing from Goal 2 as well as Goal 15. Major omissions that betray the continuous framing of forests/renewable natural resources in an outdated conservation-for-the-sake-of--conservation paradigm

Research & Innovation

Goal 9. Resilient infrastructure, inclusive sustainable industrialization and innovation
9.5 Enhance scientific research, technological capabilities of industrial sectors encourage innovation and increase the number of research and development workers per 1 million people by [x] per cent and public and private research and development spending
9.a Facilitate sustainable and resilient infrastructure development through enhanced financial, technological and technical support to African countries, LDCs and related countries
9.b Support domestic technology development, research and innovation in developing countries, including by ensuring a conducive policy environment for, inter alia, industrial diversification and value addition to commodities
9.cSignificantly increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020
Also: 2.5 genetic resources & ITK

Leveraging Climate Change

Goal 13. Action to combat climate change and its impacts (13.1-13.3)

Box 7. FOREST LINKAGES

FORESTS & TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS

Goal 15. Restored and sustainable forests and terrestrial ecosystems halting biodiversity loss (most targets – though these are mostly fashioned after a conservation and sustainable use perspective) – No reference to structural transformation in the forest sector – interaction with agriculture, mining and other 'productive sectors" is virtually absent
Goal11. Sustainable cities
Targets 11.3 and 11.a through urban forestry and Model Forests
Goal2. Food security and sustainable agriculture
Target 2.3
Goal6. Availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation
6.6 By 2020, water-related ecosystems, including forests; also 6.5
6. b Participation of local communities in water and sanitation management

SELECTED OUTCOMES GOALS facilitated by forested landscapes & good forest policies in Africa

Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere (all except 1.4. 1a. 1b)
Target 1.4
Target 1.5
Goal 2. T. 2.1, 2.2
Goal 3 (all)
Goal 6 (6.1-6.4, 6a)
Target 8.5
Target 10.1
12.2 Sustainable management of all resources by 2030

FACILITATING CONDITIONS

MEANS OF IMPLEMENTATION – Conducive international environment

Goal 17 Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development
All targets, including on Finance, Technology, Capacity, Trade and Systemic action
Goal 10 Reduce inequality among countries
10.5 Improve and implement regulation and monitoring of global financial markets
10.6 Enhanced representation and voice for developing countries in decision-making in global economic and financial institutions (also 16.8)
10.a Special and differential treatment for LDCs
10.b Encourage financial flows from ODA and FDI to LDCs & Africa in line with their own plans
10.c By 2030, reduce transaction costs of migrant remittances to less than 3 per cent
1.a Ensure significant mobilization of resources from development cooperation for LDCs to end poverty
2.bCorrect and prevent trade restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets, including through the parallel elimination of all forms of agricultural export subsidies and all export measures with equivalent effect, in accordance with the mandate of the Doha Development Round
2.cAdopt measures to ensure the proper functioning of food commodity markets and their derivatives and facilitate timely access to market information, including on food reserves, in order to help limit extreme food price volatility
Goal 13. Action to combat climate change and its impacts (13.a-13.b)
Goal 15
Targets 15.a to 15.c – International Finance and resources for biodiversity conservation and sustainable forest management
Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns (12.a-12.c)

Inclusive societies and institutions

Goal 16. Peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, justice for all and effective, accountable, inclusive institutions at all levels
Target 16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms
16.6Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels
16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels Also 16.9. 16.10 & 16.a
Goal 5. Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls (All targets)
Also, Targets:
1.b Pro-poor & gender-sensitive policies to support accelerated investment in poverty eradication
1.4 By 2030, ensure that all men and women, in particular the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology and financial services, including microfinance
10.2-1-.4 Equal opportunity and inclusive laws & policies for social, economic and political empower of all irrespective of gender, ethnicity

At the beginning of last decade, FAO's Forestry Outlook Study for Africa (FOSA 2003, op. cited) anticipated a number of changing trends and driving forces in the African forestry sector moving towards 2020. These included the evolution of wood (log) and non-wood markets away from traditional European markets, increased global competition that would impact the comparative advantages of the industry, and an increased technological divide both within Africa and with the rest of the World. It also considered as a fact that '*unlike most developed countries during their early stages of development, African countries are compelled to consider the environmental dimensions of development.*' This lead to four 'environmental issues' related to the future of protected areas, sustainable forest management, certification and African forests as carbon sink. These anticipated drivers were the basis for three 'core scenarios' involving the evolution of public sector dominance, market forces and the informal sector.

Unfortunately, none of these scenarios translated positive or negative trends into a 2020 outlook considering decisive investments in high value processing for both wood and non-wood products. Despite an important reference to NEPAD, which had just started, and to a 'grand transition' that would overcome the 'fortress scenario', the conservation/sustainable use paradigm carved for African forests remained prevalent in the assessment. The analysis did consider Africa's inverted picture industry. That is, its continued focus on exports of low value-added products such as industrial roundwood and sawn wood that 'trap the region' (except South Africa) into a sluggish segment of trade at the antipode of '*the phenomenal* [global] *growth in the trade of processed items and the decline in the share of unprocessed items*'. Yet there was no outline of scenarios directly responding to this entrapment of the African forest sector. In a different but complementary light, Temu (op. cited, 2012[48]) noted more recently that:

"Through CAADP (Comprehensive Africa's Agricultural Development Programme) the African Union recognises forests and woodlands as important resources for uplifting the continent from poverty, especially with regard to energy, food, timber, a wide range of non-timber forest products and environmental services that underpin ecosystem functions in support of agricultural productivity and sustainability. However, this goal is far from being reached and country plans are lagging behind."

This combination of missed strategic opportunity – from FOSA 2020 to the proposed SDG goal framework – to define a clear structural transformation agenda for African forests and forest products is a great cause for concern. How can everybody describe such a fundamental problem and not devise any solution directly addressing the problem? A real contribution of forests to Africa's post-2015 sustainable development agenda will have to do it. In July 2014, a side event on forest and SDGs was organised by IIED at a Ministerial conference convened by Benin on the development of the productive capacities of LDCs. Those that attended were concerned about making a living out of forests without destroying the natural capital, and also being helped to do so by the state and external interveners. To them, it was not just a matter of keeping forests intact but of how to create a sustainable agenda for wealth-creating development. How can forests be handled not just in an integrated way but also to the extent of contributing to structural transformation? That means investing in a network of high productivity enterprises (small, medium and large) that will shift the sector from its current underdevelopment and create jobs for the millions of rural Africans that will enter the labour force in the coming decades, including in the forest environment. We lack future scenarios reflecting this imperative from a forest angle, but we can make good use of available demographic and agricultural projections (Figures 13 and 14).

We must first note the tight inter-linkage and similarity of farm and forest-based activities at the level of rural African households and local value chains. This is particularly significant to issues of value-adding transformation of agricultural and non-timber forest products. Figure 14, in particular, includes forest sector products such as wood and rubber in agro-processing. In addition, African women dedicated to developing new high-quality products processed from NTFPS currently produce food and beverage of extremely high nutritive and nutraceutical value.

It is obvious that forests can also create jobs. We will look at how this can be done in practice, hoping that African decision makers from the public and private sector will do their share by supporting and investing in job-creating social enterprises benefiting women, the youth and indigenous people in forested landscapes.

[48] http://www.eoearth.org/article/Forests_and_woodlands_in_Africa

Figure 13, (MGI 2012). The need for job-creating growth in Africa



SOURCE: International Labour Organization; United Nations World Population Prospects; McKinsey Global Institute analysis

Figure 14. MGI 2012. Agriculture can create jobs



1 Includes textiles, footwear and apparel, leather products, paper and wood products, and rubber products.
NOTE: Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
SOURCE: INDSTAT4, United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), 2011; McKinsey Global Institute analysis

On the ground: African innovations and practices for transformation

This discussion paper is based on the idea that transformational changes of the scale required to meet sustainable development goals in Africa demand detailed attention to the economy and high-level convergence and connectivity between public policies and ground-level initiatives. So far, we have mostly discussed the issues from an aggregate macroeconomic level, knowing well the limitations of GDP as a measure of well-being, and knowing also that, as Africans in the street would say, 'people don't eat growth rates'. We will now consider how some of these questions coalesce on the ground, in practice and in tight relation with social processes and conditions of organisation, governance and change.

From goals to action

Sustainable development cannot be just top-down. It is a major endeavour that requires mobilising whole societies at all levels of socio-political and economic relevance, including at the bottom. The High Level Panel on the post-2015 development agenda said it beautifully:

"In the course of our discussions, we became aware of a gap between reality on the ground and the statistical targets that are tracked. We realised that the next development agenda must build on the real experiences, stories, ideas and solutions of people at the grassroots, and that we, as a Panel, must do our best to understand the world through their eyes and reflect on the issues that would make a difference to their lives."

The goal framework for sustainable development is an important and strategic tool for action. But it cannot be more than that: a tool, a framework, equipped with metrics to measure change and progress. It is not a substitute for the strategic plans, collective attitudes, determination and adaptive capacities of individual countries and regions. It is for this reason that the next development agenda needs to be inspired by the experiences, stories, ideas and solutions of people at the grassroots.

Beyond the challenge of setting the goal framework right is the imperative of acting on it right or, at least, in ways that make sense and have good outcomes for people. Acting, knowing and learning are complementary but different. As we work toward an SDG framework that will replace the MDGs, it must be clear that measuring is not acting and is not a substitute for acting, including on incomplete data and information. On the other hand, measuring is part of knowing. It is good and necessary for human actions. It is an important factor for establishing good policies. Considering so-called 'informal sectors and practices', the problem is not just 'bad stats' or lack of data but ideological entrapment and lack of strategic depth in the way we look at these system of economic difference. Envisioning them along an alternative development route is at the heart of the drive to recapture lost or hidden values in the forest sector. This will require innovation, capabilities and institutions, which we will now consider.

Is leapfrogging doable? Innovation, capabilities and institutions

There is a buzz about Africa and 'leapfrogging', which is the process of skipping second industrial revolution technologies to directly innovate with third generation technologies and processes. This will not happen at any significant scale in Africa without strong, convergent, long-term engagement and support of social forces – public, private and communal – on the continent. Nonetheless, there is a wide, fast-evolving and diversified field of innovative change taking place and impacting on all aspects of life in Africa today, including in rural forested areas.

The mobile phone is one of the emblematic examples of leapfrogging in Africa. Households that never had a landline in 40 years suddenly had five, six or more mobile phones connecting virtually all pre-adult and adult members of the household to the world and its markets. In early 2013, some 750 million mobile phone subscriptions were in use, covering two-thirds of all African adults[49]. Combined with increased broadband connectivity, ICT literacy, and digital payments, this movement is driving the African economy, including in rural areas. In Rwanda, the E-Soko project, worth almost US$7.3 million,

[49] According to reports from the 2014 SMART Days Rwanda Conference in Kigali (3-4 October). For this and other information cited from the Conference, see: http://www.scidev.net/sub-saharan-africa/icts/news/icts-contributing-to-africa-s-growth.html#sthash.bhtMzmKJ.dpuf

updates farmers on commodity prices via daily mobile phone short message service (SMS), thus helping them to access markets. Mali's telemedicine provides healthcare to hundreds of rural people, while Kenya's Kilimo Salama scheme provides crop insurance for farmers using the M-Pesa payment gateway, helping them to better manage natural hazards such as drought. In Uganda, Makerere University's College of Computing and Information has developed a phone-imaging set-up in which a smartphone is attached to a microscope to enable rapid diagnoses of malaria[50]. The technique could generate additional diagnostic tests for tuberculosis and worm infestations and will help to lower the number of deaths from malaria and slow the emergence of drug-resistant strains of this deadly parasite.

Similarly, two young entrepreneurs from Burkina Faso, and Burundi, beat 650 competitors from nearly 40 countries to win the US$25,000 grand prize in the Global Social Venture Competition (GSVC) in April 2013 for their 'Faso soap', which aims to prevent malaria by repelling mosquitoes. The soap contains locally sourced herbs and natural ingredients, including shea butter, essential lemongrass oil and other secret ingredients. This is the first time that an entry from Africa has won the GSVC, an international competition launched by the University of California, Berkeley to help starting entrepreneurs transform their ideas into impact products[51].

From smartphones and crowd financing to green buildings[52], creative thinkers, innovators and sustainability entrepreneurs are starting to modify the business ecosystem in Africa, providing innovative solutions to many of the continent's challenges. In addition to the multi-layered connectivity that innovations bring to urban and rural economies and to the nascent eco trends that they establish for the economy as a whole, many of the new products have direct bearing on forest landscapes and people. This, obviously, is the case of the Faso soap and E-soko projects.

Whether they are building bamboo bikes in Ghana or electric bikes in South Africa, or exporting several million dollars worth of Ethiopian and Kenyan flowers, processing edible insects or manufacturing dental care medicine (see Table 7), people are increasingly using African natural capital in newly productive and ingenious ways. For example, additive layer manufacturing is only a tiny fraction of what the Songhai Center (see Table 7) does with its no-waste, totally integrated model farm in Benin and other countries – this is a true example of the 'blue economy' (which is defined as 'green with more innovative local content'). Moringa olifeira tree processing is developed, along with other plant-based forest products, in an impressive number of countries, including by the African Model Forest Network collaborating with governments and civil society in Cameroon, Congo and DRC. Next to more traditional green/environmental initiatives, examples abound of a new direction slowly emerging and being increasingly backed by public-private research centers and green economy institutions.

Table 7. Africa innovates: Smart illustrations from the ground

No	Institution/NGO/Association	Innovation and explanation
1.	Nyabyumba Farmers' Group Uganda(CIAT) **Area of focus** Agriculture (potato production) **Organisational details** 40 men and women	Produce improved potatoes from clean seeds provided by the National Agricultural Research Organization (NARO). In 2000, they formed a farmer field school to increase potato production. Studied the market environment with their partners to build a scope of their action. To satisfy the demand, farmers have a staggered planting system, producing 5 to 10 tons per month. Steady income, success is based on: long-term support from research and development partners, improve knowledge in production and marketing, and collective market.

[50]See http://www.scidev.net/sub-saharan-africa/disease/news/curbing-inaccurate-diagnoses-of-diseases.html
[51]See http://www.malarianexus.com/news/grand-prize-of-the-global-social-venture-competition-gsvc-awarded-to/
[52] See http://www.leadingarchitecture.co.za/gbcsa-convention-inspire-uniquely-african-green-innovation/

2.	Benin – Additive layer manufacturing with Africa (AWA) **Area of focus** Agriculture	A manufacturing process using wire or plastic powder. Easy to access, fast, straightforward and economical. It involves fusing the material layer by layer until the desired shape is produced. **NZAMUJO Godfrey: gnzamujo@yahoo.com** SONGHAI: www.songhai.org
3.	Benin – Rehabilitation of the Ouankou waterway **Area of focus** Agriculture	Rehabilitation of 2km of previously destroyed gallery forest to ensure satisfactory water flow and promote farming, beekeeping, craftwork and fruit picking. **AGNORO Maliki: agnoromaliki@gmail.com** Jura-Africa Benin: www.jura-afrique.ch/JAbenin/index.html
4.	Burkina Faso – Hybrid bread oven **Area of focus** Agriculture	A solar oven that reduces the consumption of wood for baking bread and suitable for use in semi-rural areas for production of small loaves, avoiding the need for ancillary machinery (such as kneaders) and reducing investment. **ILBOUDO William: william@isomet-bf.com** Isomet sarl: www.isomet-bf.com
5.	Burkina Faso – Multi-purpose crusher for cattle and poultry feed **Area of focus** Agriculture	A highly efficient crushing plant that enables farm byproducts and plant cover (millet, sorghum, etc.) to be reused to make feed for cattle and poultry. **ROUAMBA Tibila Oumar: entreprisekato@gmail.com** KATO ! SARL
6.	Burkina Faso – Warrantage **Area of focus** Agriculture, microfinance	A system of credit available to producers in rural areas, which provides funds using farm produce inventory as collateral. This innovation helps reduce the obligation to sell off cereals in periods when prices are low. SOMDA Simplice: sossibf@fasonet.bf SOS Sahel International Burkina Faso: www.sossahelburkina.org
7.	Mali – Special rural development programme **Area of focus** Agriculture, microfinance	The setting up of community centres for integrated agricultural development, providing members with training, access to agricultural finance, basic welfare cover and practical services. **KANE Moussa: cmsi98mali@yahoo.fr** *Association des innovateurs pour conseil au développement* (AICD, association of development consultancy innovators)
8.	Inclusive green growth by the Climate Innovation Center – South Africa **Area of focus** Agriculture research Partnership with colleges and township such as Alexandra, Ivory Park and Soweto where they carry out workshops	The community workshops yield valuable and actionable findings on how to maximise inclusive green growth and climate technology innovation. Some findings: ▪ Improve the quality, timeliness and flow of information on climate-friendly solutions to end users ▪ Match financing to end user capability and stream of benefits, thereby reducing upfront costs of switching or adoption. ▪ Partner with locally established actors in the social economy to extend the community-level presence of institutional apparatus.
9.	Benin – Processing edible insects **Area of focus** Health, NTFPs and food security	The project encourages the domestication and processing of edible insects as an alternative to meat in order to combat malnutrition and contribute to food security in the region. **TCHIBOZO Séverin: tchisev@yahoo.fr** *Centre de recherche pour la gestion de la biodiversité* (CRGB, centre for research into biodiversity management): www.crgbbj.org
10.	Central African Republic – Natural medicine against dental caries **Area of focus** Health, NTFPs and food security	Obtained from a combination of three plants – garlic, sugarcane and oil palm – this natural medicine helps prevent caries and a range of bucco-dental conditions. **BIDIMU Kabuya: bidtrade2002@yahoo.co.uk** Nsanga Lubangu centre for research into traditional medicines

11.	Chad – Sustainable Moringa management **Area of focus** Health, NTFPs and food security	Processing and production of Moringa oleifera leaves by groups of women to help reduce maternal and child malnutrition rates YOKIDINAN Saingaral: aapprodilom@yahoo.fr *Association pour la promotion des Initiatives locales dans le Mandoul* (APRODILOM, association for the promotion of local initiatives locales in the Mandoul region)
12.	Benin – Sitatunga Valley green museum **Area of focus** Environment, waste energy and water, cities and disadvantaged urban areas	A facility dedicated to the introduction of the public to the local small wild fauna. The aim is to highlight the value of wetland biodiversity, educate the general public and generate resources for the reserve. **KOUDERIN Kotcholé Martial: martial.kouderin@credi-ong.org** Regional centre for research and education for integrated development: www.credi-ong.org
13.	Burkina Faso – Concert'Eau: access to drinking water in rural areas **Area of focus** Environment, waste energy and water	The provision of access to drinking water for the remotest populations in Burkina Faso and Africa generally, by installing Concert'Eau kits, a system for the purification of water using ultrafiltration membranes. TAPSOBA Issa: issanaba@yahoo.fr E.T.I.T
14.	Burkina Faso – Gafreh plastic bag recycling facility **Area of focus** Environment, waste energy and water	OUEDRAOGO Haoua: gafreh@yahoo.fr *Groupe d'action des femmes pour la relance économique du Houet* (Gafreh, Women's action group for the reinvigoration of the Houet economy): www.gafreh.org
15.	Burkina Faso – Protected area conservation **Area of focus** Environment, waste energy and water	Sustainable, participatory management of protected forests that are highly anthropised and threatened with extinction due to unsuitable activities (forest clearance, brush burning, poaching, etc.). KARAMA Mamadou: mfkarama@yahoo.fr *Association de gestion des ressources naturelles et de faune de la Comoé*-Léraba (AGEREF, Association for the management of the natural resources and fauna in the Comoé-Léraba area): www.agerefcl.org
16.	Burundi – Environmentally compatible organic briquettes **Area of focus** Environment, waste energy and water	These briquettes combine wood chips, parchment and other organic by-products such as bagasse to form a substitute for wood and charcoal. RWEMERA Claver: loicqueen@yahoo.fr Biofuel Moso
17.	Cameroon – Cleantech for lighting and employment in rural areas **Area of focus** Environment, waste, energy and water	An LED lamp (Nuru Lamp) containing a rechargeable battery for use with the POWERCycle, the first pedal-driven electricity generator marketed anywhere in the world. NDONGSOK Durando: d.ndongsok@s2-gmbh.com S2 Services Sarl: www.s2-gmbh.com
18.	Egypt – Financial innovation at the service of industrial decontamination **Area of focus** Environment, waste, energy and water	Funding conversion to natural gas for 224 brickworks in the Arab Abu Saad region to reduce polluting atmospheric emissions harmful to the health of local populations. **NABIL Maysoun: maysounali2@gmail.com** Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency (EEAA): www.eeaa.gov.eg
19.	Ghana – Ghana Bamboo Bikes Initiative **Area of focus** Environment, waste, energy and water	Practical training in how to build bicycles from bamboo (reliable and flexible in use, suited to the terrain in rural areas) to encourage a spirit of entrepreneurship and provide skills to young people. **DAPAAH Bernice: bernice@ghanabamboobikes.org** Bright Generation Community Foundation: www.ghanabamboobikes.org

20.	The CBD's new retail and leisure center-Newtown junction **Area of focus** Commercial centers	The retail and leisure centre functioned as one of the anchor venues for the Absa Joburg City Festival, with a number of public performances taking place on its premises, hinting at the potential for the location to host similar events going forward. 40 retail stores offering various goods and services to the public
21.	Botswana – Solar Ear hearing aid **Area of focus** Social innovations	NYIRENDA-ZABULA Modesta: chiza@ivaluenet.com Solar Ear – Global Social innovations conducive to gender equality and alleviating the social exclusion of the most vulnerable members of society
22.	Burkina Faso – SmartyBox: an innovative telecommunications platform **Area of focus** Information and Communication technology	A low-cost, freeware-based system for quick, straightforward implementation of innovative telephony services for an organisation or a community. SONDE Amadou: asonde@advencya.com Advencya Technologies
23.	Côte d'Ivoire – Cicommerce (Côte d'Ivoire commerce) **Area of focus** Information and Communication technology	A commercial information network and online market platform aimed at amplifying the impact of new technology on Côte d'Ivoire commerce and the living standards of the most impoverished population groups. SOKOTY Koffi Christian: sokotykoffi@yahoo.fr Cicommerce (subsidiary of ATS): www.cicommerce.net
24.	Côte d'Ivoire – Schoolbook **Area of focus** Information and communication technology	Using a web platform and SMS, this project enables school activities to be monitored, strengthening the management of school administration and training courses in the use of IT tools. COULIBALY Pekango: pekango.coulibaly@symbiose-group.org

Amartya Sen's (1981) path-breaking contribution to the analysis of deprivation and poverty[53] was set by a single question: how is it that people can starve when there is plenty of food? This question, perfectly applicable to the prevalent forest-rich, poor people situation in Africa, was the basis for his theory of entitlements, which looks at the way people can develop capabilities and turn their endowments into commodity bundles. By capability, we mean the combination of knowledge, skills, attitudes and strategies through which people can understand their choices, exercise their freedom and agency, and produce social, environmental and economic wealth.

More recently, Lee *et al.* 2014 [54] have applied their understanding of capabilities to the problem of innovation in Africa. They make the case that Africa is now ideally placed to develop 'innovation capabilities' that would allow it to capture a 'latecomer advantage' in the global economic system. Two critical factors intervene in this potential competitive advantage of African economies. The inability of the conventional fossil-fuelled industrial model to scale up and spread prosperity demands an alternative model of sustainable development driven by innovation. Africa also has powerful competitive advantages based on its abundance of resources (sun, land and water), which can be utilised as sources of energy, both to power its own industrial development and to provide an export platform — as demonstrated clearly by China.

African countries can capture latecomer advantages by adopting green technologies, leapfrogging the stage of 'carbon lock-in' that is holding back the developed world … Almost all the technologies

[53] Sen A.K. 1981 - Poverty and Famines: an essay on entitlements and deprivation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[54] Lee, K., Juma, C. and Mathews, J. 2014. *Innovation capabilities for sustainable development in Africa*, WIDER Working Paper 2014/062, World Institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University, Tokyo. The authors cite numerous works and publications, which we haven't been able to reproduce. All the analysis of innovation capability in this last part of the subsection is based on their precise and inspiring work.

involved in renewable power generation, energy efficiency, heat and power cogeneration, and development of alternative fuels and transport systems emanate from the advanced world. However, possibilities for applying them are found for the most part in Africa, where carbon lock-in does not act as a constraint. There is an historic opportunity for African countries to build new industrial systems based on renewable energies and resource efficiency that will generate advantages for the countries concerned (and serve as export platforms for their future development) as well as providing a pathway of sustainable development to the rest of the world (ibid).

Thus, innovation can play a key role in Africa's 'stage-skipping into a new eco-friendly techno-economic paradigm' unconstrained by the infrastructural inertia of carbon lock-in. The revival of agriculture also offers new opportunities to leapfrog into green technologies. For example, Burkina Faso adopted second-generation insect-resistant, genetically modified (GM) cotton that has significantly reduced the amount of insecticides that would have been used if it had pursued older production methods...

The area of information and communications technologies, especially in mobile telephones, has demonstrated the power of such windows of opportunity. Other emerging platforms such as genomics, biopolymers and new materials offer similar windows of opportunity. In fact, the phenomenon of exponential scientific advancement and technological abundance provides Africa with more windows of opportunity than its Asian predecessors... Furthermore, Africa's heterogeneous market characteristics allow it to customize catch-up models to market size. The rise of regional integration and promotion of intra-African trade allows the continent to adopt diverse catch-up strategies that are suited to the different market sizes (ibid).

This, however, is far from being easy. So far innovation has been limited in Africa's economic growth despite its importance for diversification and higher value-added products because most African countries are lacking in innovation capabilities. Several authors see this 'capability failure' as a more serious problem than market or system failure. Growth, jobs and FDI are not enough. Conscious and planned efforts must be made to build up technological capabilities and access the vast fund of knowledge available in other countries but also to promote indigenous innovation, utilising public research institutions as well as universities.

In that process, the better off African countries should beware of possible 'middle-income trap'. This happens when other competing countries flood the market with similar goods, as could be the case with the flower industry in Kenya. The country must then innovate to move up the chain of added value, leaving the space for next-tier countries to occupy. 'Modified examples of such upgrading in flower firms in Africa would be producing flowers that can last longer, have specific smells, and use fewer pesticides. All these require innovation' (*ibid)*; it may also require African firms to enter into marketing and set up their own outlets with their own brands in Europe. Such succession has happened in Asia, where Korea and Taiwan took over the room left by Japan, and in turn, as these two countries advanced, the next-tier countries moved into the places they left (Lee *et al.*, 2014).

Presently, private African firms are unable to pursue and conduct in-house R&D, even among middle-income countries. It will take clear vision and sustained backing by government, particularly in terms of R&D support and financing to harness emerging opportunities. For example, the wind turbine industry in China and India used to be dominated by European firms. With local technological effort and government support, including local content requirements on FDI firms, local firms have made a significant and successful entry into the sector.

More than market or system failure, 'capability failure' is a strong justification for government activism using diverse strategies already experienced by countries such as China, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand. Some example cases in Africa are more about adoption of new technologies than local innovations. 'But adoption is a beginning or stepping stone for learning and eventual innovation. Without adopting, you cannot learn' (Lee *et al*., 2014).

… Foreign knowledge is critical. [Otherwise] the latecomers' catching-up effort is often at risk and takes too much time and costs... In general, the diverse channels of knowledge, access, and learning include such modes as: training in foreign firms and institutes, OEM, licensing, joint ventures, co-development with foreign specialised R&D firms, transfers of individual scientists or engineers, reverse brain drain, overseas R&D centres, strategic alliances, and international mergers and acquisitions… Successful technological development by latecomers tends to involve government support, access to foreign

knowledge, and private firms' effort... The development agenda should emphasise … infrastructure or business climate improvement but also cultivation of private firms and their innovation capabilities. Thus, African countries should be allowed policy space to nurture their local firms [which] are unlikely to emerge and flourish if they are exposed from the beginning to competition with foreign goods (ibid).

Africa missed the train of development in the 1960s while East Asian countries made headway. It is too early to tell if African countries will be able to translate the extraordinary opportunity offered by the latecomer advantage in the progressive world shift from a carbon to an inclusive green economic model. The current state of knowledge about what Africa should do, however, is clear. It leaves us to see how to move this agenda forward with better-prepared African actors and governments.

Grounded networks and governance novelty: Model Forests and economic transformation

An innovation agenda for Africa is integral to transforming the African forest economy in a way that turns it into a real contributor to the continent's growth and transformation plans in a post-2015 perspective. For this agenda to be truly inclusive, forest actors and innovators, particularly women, the youth and indigenous people, have an important role to play as acting subjects of forest value chains development. An international consensus is emerging today about the landscape scale and intersectoral nature of this movement. It will involve both new landscape-scale governance models and a new business model giving greater space, role and means to local people in forest businesses and value chains. In this emerging framework, corporate social responsibility will be a means toward such a new forest economy, not its core strategy. However, corporations and conservation interests can play a key role in helping an inclusive, integrated and value-adding economy emerge in the forest sector. They can share know-how and capabilities, facilitate local value chain financing and engage in transformative alliances with governments, national firms and local change forces. This will require a new, more ambitious vision of forests as an integral part of a sustained post-2015 transformation of the African social, economic and environmental landscape.

An increasing number of organisations, creators and innovators are already engaged in that process. At a conference on landscapes, people, food and nature that took place in Nairobi, Kenya, in July 2014[55], more than 100 practitioners of the landscape approach in Africa met to share their experiences and propose a way forward in accordance with the post-2015 agenda. They proposed a rethink of governance as well as policy, research, finance and innovation. Viable landscapes require sectoral integration of forests with eco-agriculture and arrangement with other sectors. It requires multi-stakeholder governance as well knowledge of existing institutional infrastructure and resources, metrics for assessing change; interconnected systems to link action and social capital at different scales; capacity to manage institutional complexity, and adaptive, collaborative management systems specifically oriented towards learning.

Model Forests are an emerging example of the nature of the investments needed to make such a configuration work. The concept has an advantage over most landscape approaches because it designs a systematic method for establishing transformative multi-stakeholder governance at landscape scales. In short, Model Forests are a place, a partnership and a process: the place is a landscape or ecosystem-scale area; the partnership is voluntary and inclusive, from national policymakers to local farmers; and the process is a journey of dialogue, experimentation and innovation designed to understand what 'sustainability' means within a given landscape and then to use the partnership to work toward it. Model Forests are not just 'projects' or physical entities: they are long-term intergenerational processes that aim to make sustainable development a reality through collaboration, adaptation, social learning and innovation. Each Model Forest is unique but all share this common framework, underpinned by six core principles: partnerships, landscapes, sustainability, governance, program of activities, and networking.

The partnership is a broad-based, voluntary and inclusive sustainability alliance based on inclusive governance boards and platforms. Its members range from national policymakers to local farmers,

[55] The conference was organised by the Landscape, People, Food and Nature alliance, led by EcoAgriculture Partners. See www.landscapepeoplefoodandnature.org

indigenous people, rural women, and local governments, small and large corporations, park managers, NGOs, universities and research institutions. This means a variety of people with differing interests, values and perspectives work to understand each other and overcome their differences and conflicts in order to address national and landscape priorities. Model Forests are also large working landscapes including forests along a wide range of spatial entities – villages, towns and cities; farms and agro-forests; community and municipal forests; forest, mining and agro-industrial concessions; protected areas, wetlands and coastal areas.

Model Forests are also non-hierarchical nested networks dedicated to learning, knowledge sharing, and capacity development. Model Forest practitioners network at practically all scales – local, national, regional and global – and form a unique North-South, South-South international platform where different types of ideas, people, social interests, and ways of knowing – scientific and ethno-scientific – interconnect to address issues of local and global relevance (from biodiversity, climate change and ecosystem services to economic development, cultural growth, environmental justice, and intergenerational equity). There are now more than 60 Model Forests in the world, in about 30 countries. Together they form the IMFN and they also associate by regions: Africa, Asia, Canada, Latin America, the Mediterranean and the Baltic Sea[56].

Finally, Model Forests are fully working landscapes of forests, farms, protected areas, businesses, rivers and towns. The Model Forest Network is a community of practice, upon which the African Model Forest Network's (AMFN) One Programme (Figure 15) is based. This is the African Model Forests' unified framework of economic intervention. It is established on indigenous, technical and scientific knowledge and promotes the development of green value chains supported by networks of social enterprises – or green social businesses. The aim is to generate growth, create jobs, and eradicate poverty while sustaining the resources by investing in and preserving the natural capital.

Figure 15. The AMFN *One Programme*

[56] The concept was put forth by Canada as its contribution to Rio 92, and the network is globally coordinated in Ottawa by Natural Resources Canada. See www.imfn.net for details

The One Programme also seeks to reconcile legality with legitimacy as a means to develop a durable social response to rampant illegality in forest-related sectors. For the rule of law to prevail, we need to remove the long-standing disconnect between the current system of laws – mostly inherited from the colonial and postcolonial era – and rural markets and economies. For example, the so-called informal timber sector accounts for the greater part of the wood economy and employs three times more people than export-oriented industrial logging of the wood economy in Cameroon[57], and this reality also prevails in other Central African countries. The potential market for African plants, food, aromatics, cosmetics and pharmaceuticals is huge, but forest-based rural producers need all kinds of paperwork and authorisation to sell their produce in national and regional markets. The institutional and regulatory environment needs to be drastically improved if a grounded green development economy is to succeed in African rural forested landscapes.

Important headways are being made. A regional COMIFAC (Central Africa Forest Commission) Directive on NTFP trade illustrates this, but it is just a beginning. The work will have to be thorough, systematised and applied to a much wider range of forest-related activities (from timber to mining). At the same time, microfinance and a range of other financial, technical, pedagogical and governance tools need to be mobilised and more efficiently packaged in support of rural producers and entrepreneurs.

Model Forest platforms were offered as long-term governance vehicles that can effectively contribute to these innovations and mutation of African economies. Similarly, the AMFN initiated a mobile rural business school connected to a farm field school and a network of Local Experts Facilitators and state extension agents to provide training, coaching and mentoring support to local farmers and carriers of business ideas. A project to develop a Model Forest-Green Business label is en route to mark out and better incorporate the sustainability, equity and fair trade contents of these productions, while exploring and investing in new niche markets for rural entrepreneurs. Several thousand farmers have been mobilised to integrate mycorrhizal organic fertilisers and improved eco-agriculture techniques on the premise that African forests can only be 'saved' through a green carbon-saving agricultural revolution at the interface between the two sectors.

Several years ago, Margaret Wheatley and Deborah Frieze[58] put forth their vision of the life cycle of emergence. 'The world, they say, doesn't change one person at a time'; it changes through networks and critical connections among kindred spirits that can 'develop the new knowledge, practices, courage and commitment that lead to broad-based change':

But networks aren't the whole story. As networks grow and transform into active, working communities of practice, we discover how life truly changes, which is through emergence. When separate, local efforts connect with each other as networks, then strengthen as communities of practice, suddenly and surprisingly a new system emerges at a greater level of scale. This system of influence possesses qualities and capacities that were unknown in the individuals. It isn't that they were hidden; they simply don't exist until the system emerges. They are properties of the system... And the system that emerges always possesses greater power and influence than is possible through planned, incremental change. Emergence is how life creates radical change and takes things to scale.

Signs already exist that such a transformational process for Africa and African forested landscapes may be in the making. But this will not happen inorganically and without stepping up existing efforts by all stakeholders to establish the kind of agenda and communities of practice that have been suggested throughout this discussion paper. The jury is still out, as is the potential to succeed.

[57] Pye-Smith, C. 2010 Cameroon's hidden harvest. CIFOR, Bogor, Indonesia

[58] Wheatley, Margaret., and Frieze, Deborah, 2006. *Using emergence to take social innovation to scale*. See www.margaretwheatley.com/articles/emergence.html

Conclusion

This paper makes the case that the African forest economy is 'inverted' in its way of producing economic value. Other world regions make between 68 per cent and 76 per cent of their forest value added from manufacturing and advanced wood processing. Africa does the reverse. It makes 65 per cent of its forest value from primary forestry activities, such as logging and fuel wood collection. Worse, even this low value utilisation of its forests is sluggish, representing a tiny 6.5 per cent of what the world makes from this subsector.

The paper argues that such a structural configuration of the forest economy is an underdevelopment trap. While mimicking the same deficient inversion of African economies, the forest sector has not contributed significantly to the remarkable African growth of the past 15 to 20 years. This is contrary to other sectors that did so, such as services (banking, telecom), retailing and big commodity exports. Even agriculture contributes an average five per cent since about 2003, though mostly from land expansion rather than productivity growth[58]. The forest challenge is the same as the broader African economic challenge, except that it is more acute. This paper argues that part of the problem lies with a narrative on forests that remains cast around an old schizophrenic paradigm opposing logging and biodiversity conservation, effectively turning them into unique strategic poles for the forest sector. Both have value but they cannot be the strategic underpinning of decisive post-2015 contribution of forests to the economic convergence of Africa with the rest of the world.

Because of these unique features, the post-2015 priority goals and targets for African forests cannot be the same as those of other regions. They must first meet other African priorities in structural transformation, productivity and diversification and be driven by broad and determined investment in innovation (in green products and systems, as well as novel ways of financing them and managing strategic information). They must also change the conservative outlook on African forests.

The goal framework, as it was cast and submitted to the UN General Assembly in September 2014 does not have these African priorities properly reflected in the forest and terrestrial ecosystem Goal 15. It does not also pay sufficient attention to the interconnectivity of agriculture and food security objectives with the forest sector. The same could be said of the absence of critical connections between health and nutrition (in Goal 3 as well Goal 2), and the importance of the forest sector for both these objectives. The Africa forest module that we presented in figure 12 is a tool for responding to these shortcomings. It proposes to reframe forest priorities in a way that aligns them more firmly with Africa's transformational priorities of the next 15-20 years. Not all critical or missing connections are reinstated by the modular approach, but it allows for strategic direction and integration which could have otherwise been missed. Neither does Goal 15 need to be redrafted nor the framework renegotiated. However, both need to be reviewed from a different strategic angle by policy makers, and in ways that seek integration and attention to the priorities and transformational connections needed to achieve the SDGs in Africa.

Finally, our discussion gives enormous weight to the need for an innovation agenda and strategy for Africa, including in the forest sector. The position of African and least developed nations in this new century is historic novelty. The world is at the door of a third industrial revolution. Not since the beginning of the first, has it witnessed the scale of groundbreaking growth and transformation that has been happening in developing nations over the past 40 years. Never has any group of countries had as much material and strategic information at its disposal for doing it 'right' as African and least developing countries do today. Because these countries will also need to do it differently, important risks are involved in the process. Untested methods and manufacturing processes will need to be developed, as well as new, more productive and at the same time more sustainable green enterprises. A hybrid network of traditional businesses and social enterprises will need to be fostered, along with better use of local indigenous knowledge and systems of intellectual property rights that will strengthen least developed countries' capabilities and innovation strategies. Risk, uncertainty and surprise are inherent to real system shifts, and that is exactly what the UN system is setting itself to do in a shared post-2015 agenda. Old ways in new clothes will not be enough to get there.

[58] Kanu B.S, A.O. Salami and K. Numasawa, 2014. *Inclusive Growth: An imperative for African Agriculture*. African Development Bank, Tunis.



ANNEX : Selected goals and targets in relation to efforts currently made in Africa (By Eliane Bappa)

Targets	Explanation
Goal 1. End poverty in all its forms everywhere	
Target 1.4 By 2030 ensure that all men and women, particularly the poor and the vulnerable, have equal rights to economic resources, as well as access to basic services, ownership, and control over land and other forms of property, inheritance, natural resources, appropriate new technology, and financial services including microfinance.	Entitlement, ownership
Target 1.5 By 2030 build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable situations, and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme events and other economic, social and environmental shocks and disasters.	Make use of new farming techniques that are adequate to the context in every region. We have, for example, the use of bio fertilisers, ameliorated seeds and soil management.
Goal 2. End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture	
2.2 By 2030 end all forms of malnutrition, including achieving by 2025 the internationally agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children under five years of age, and address the nutritional needs of	Measures are being taken by the African Union through CAADP, its agricultural policy framework to achieve that target for children

adolescent girls, pregnant and lactating women, and older persons.	
2.3 By 2030 double the agricultural productivity and the incomes of small scale food producers, particularly women, indigenous peoples, family farmers, pastoralists and fishers, including through secure and equal access to land, other productive resources and inputs, knowledge, financial services, markets, and opportunities for value addition and non-farm employment.	This implies including small producers in the development process of every African country. In the past, decisions used to leave from the top to the bottom with no consideration being taken on the situation in the field. This explains why policies remain a discourse. The dynamic starts from the bottom while the top completes this movement with new techniques.
Goal 3. Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages	
3.3 By 2030 end the epidemics of AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and neglected tropical diseases and combat hepatitis, water-borne diseases, and other communicable diseases.	Measures are being taken on the continent to fight against these deadly diseases. We can name the African Health Strategy, 2007-2015 (2007) and the Abuja Call 2006 for Accelerated Action Towards Universal Access to services the fight against HIV / AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and services in Africa by 2010 (2006).
Goal 4. Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote life-long learning opportunities for all	
4.7 By 2030 ensure all learners acquire knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including among others through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship, and appreciation of cultural diversity and of culture's contribution to sustainable development.	The resources Africans need to evolve are already there. We lack not only the finances but most especially the knowledge to exploit these resources judiciously. It can be completed through technology transfer, vocational trainings etc.
Goal 6. Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all	
6.3 By 2030, improve water quality by reducing pollution, eliminating dumping and minimising release of hazardous chemicals and materials, halving the proportion of untreated wastewater, and increasing recycling and safe reuse by x% globally	Access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation services are major constrains in the continent. Most African countries, conscious of this plague, signed the Declaration of Sharm El-Sheikh Sheikh in which those commitments are based. Ministers in charge of health and safety should allocate specific annual percentages to hygiene programs and sanitation and water, which is 0.5% and 1% at least of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for health and safety, and 1% for water respectively.
6.6 By 2020 protect and restore water-related ecosystems, including mountains, forests, wetlands, rivers, aquifers and lakes.	Given that the continent is rich in natural resources (biodiversity), it becomes important to build policies that take into account every sector needed to ease the livelihood of man and protect future generations.
Goal 7. Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, and modern energy for all	
7.2 Increase substantially the share of renewable energy in the global energy mix by 2030	In as much as Africa still boasts about its natural resources, caution needs to be taken as to their exploitation. It is important that as we fight to acquire new technologies, we should think of alternative measures as well.
Goal 8. Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all	

8.2 Achieve higher levels of productivity of economies through diversification, technological upgrading and innovation, including through a focus on high value added and labour-intensive sectors.	Experience has shown that actions get great impact when they inter-relate.
8.4 Improve progressively through 2030 global resource efficiency in consumption and production, and endeavour to decouple economic growth from environmental degradation in accordance with the 10-year framework of programmes on sustainable consumption and production, with developed countries taking the lead.	African countries should strive to produce first for its population. There are shortages in production and the little that is produced is exported at low income while we export a lot of these goods that can be produced and are produced to feed our populations. These goods not only compete with local products but at the same time gain grounds faster than local goods.
Goal 9. Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation	
9.1 Develop quality, reliable, sustainable and resilient infrastructure, including regional and trans-border infrastructure, to support economic development and human well-being, with a focus on affordable and equitable access for all.	Trans-border trade in the continent is also a point that needs to be developed.
9.5 Enhance scientific research, upgrade the technological capabilities of industrial sectors in all countries, particularly developing countries, including by 2030 encouraging innovation and increasing the number of R&D workers per one million people by x% and public and private R&D spending	Emphasis most be laid on R & D to develop new techniques that respond to the African context.
Goal 10. Reduce inequality within and among countries	
10.6 Ensure enhanced representation and voice of developing countries in decision making in global international economic and financial institutions in order to deliver more effective, credible, accountable and legitimate institutions	It is important that African countries get a say in decision making in international financial institutions. We notice that decisions taken to date in those institutions are not in favour of developing countries. The context is every country is different so these disparities have to be taken into account and the only way to do so properly is for Africans to be present at the table.
Goal 11. Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable	
11.5 By 2030 significantly reduce the number of deaths and the number of affected people and decrease by y% the economic losses relative to GDP caused by disasters, including water-related disasters, with the focus on protecting the poor and people in vulnerable situations.	Every part of the continent has its peculiarities. We find cities where life is affordable and others due to their geographical location face considerable difficulties. Measures have to be taken to see to it that the populations living in such areas get the attention they need to overcome natural disasters.
Goal 12. Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns	
12.2 By 2030 achieve sustainable management and efficient use of natural resources.	
12.6 Encourage companies, especially large and trans-national companies, to adopt sustainable practices and to integrate sustainability information into their reporting cycle.	They should avoid dumping their waste chemicals in the neighborhood. Measures to canalise waste emerging from industrial production have to be set up so as to avoid pollution and untold deaths.
Goal 13. Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts	
13.1 Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate related hazards and natural disasters in all countries.	Africa is not responsible for the climate change that affects the entire world but suffers a great deal from it. It is therefore

13.2 Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies and planning. 13.3 improve education, awareness raising and human and institutional capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction and early warning.	important that each state takes this change into account when adopting its policies.
Goal 15. Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss	
15.2 By 2020, promote the implementation of sustainable management of all types of forests, halt deforestation, restore degraded forests, and increase afforestation and reforestation by x% globally 15.3 By 2020, combat desertification and restore degraded land and soil, including land affected by desertification, drought and floods, and strive to achieve a land-degradation neutral world. 15.6 Ensure fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilisation of genetic resources, and promote appropriate access to genetic resources. 15.9 By 2020, integrate ecosystems and biodiversity values into national and local planning, development processes and poverty reduction strategies, and accounts.	To face these difficulties with ease, African countries have to adopt integrated approaches.
Goal 16. Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels	
16.5 Substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all its forms. 16.6 Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all levels. 16.7 Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels.	Africans still lag behind when it comes to accountability and transparency. It is important to be responsible for one's acts and to learn from others.
Goal 17. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development	
17.1 Strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through international support to developing countries to improve domestic capacity for tax and other revenue collection. 17.7 Promote development, transfer, dissemination and diffusion of environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favourable terms, including on concessional and preferential terms, as mutually agreed. 17.9 Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South, and triangular co-operation.	

The UN's Open Working Group (OWG) proposed draft sustainable development goals (SDGs) in July 2014.

This paper evaluates the proposed SDGs from the perspective of the forests and the communities that live in them, from the point of view of Africa. It presents some of the major trends in forest policy and its impact, assessing whether forest policies have been effective and what the critical issues are that this region must overcome, for forests to contribute to sustainable development.

Project materials

Forests

Keywords:
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), Post-2015 agenda, Good governance

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